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INTRODUCTION
How well does the American legal system balance the diverse values society
espouses? Courts must often navigate values that are not consistent,
commensurate, or subject to ordinal ranking. The challenge of incommensurate
values arises at the interface between legal regimes whose respective values
may be in tension or within a single regime espousing multiple values. But
even legal regimes that nominally serve a single value may still encounter
incommensurability issues regarding its implementation.
This article examines the confluence of incommensurate values within the
important and increasingly frequent context of antitrust challenges to
information product1 redesigns. When addressing antitrust challenges to search
engine modifications, for example, the courts must account for free speech-a
value exogenous to antitrust-as well as competition and innovation, two goals
often considered in tandem within an antitrust framework. Navigating speech
and consumer welfare considerations-the dominant value of antitrust-
presents a classic incommensurability problem. Moreover, even competition
and innovation have proven to be largely incommensurate in practice,
notwithstanding their shared consumer welfare orientation. Despite antitrust's
ostensible facility with more nuanced tradeoffs, the courts have been largely
unwilling or unable to transcend binary "all-or-nothing" outcomes when either
speech or innovation-based defenses are implicated. Courts have tried to avoid
tradeoffs between values by designating one value as controlling, using all-or-
nothing approaches that can do injustice to one or more competing values. This
Article explains why legal middle grounds, while potentially difficult, can and
must be established to deal with speech and innovation.
See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE
NETWORK ECONOMY 3 (1999) (defining information as "anything that can be
digitized.... [B]aseball scores, books, databases, magazines, movies, music, stock quotes,
and Web pages are all information goods").
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The article analyzes a number of cases, involving firms that dominate their
respective information product markets, characterized by speech and/or
innovation-based defenses. The plaintiff in Kinderstart, which operated a
website that provided a search engine and directory for content associated with
young children, sued search engine giant Google.2 Kinderstart alleged that
Google engaged in anticompetitive conduct, including the manipulation of its
PageRank system to deflate the ranking of Google's own competitors in niche
markets.3 Google maintained that the "antitrust claims [were] barred by the
First Amendment." 4 Similarly, Sunbeam Television, a local broadcaster, sued
the dominant television audience ratings company Nielsen; Sunbeam alleged
that Nielsen had hastily introduced a flawed modification to its system of
measuring audience size to exclude potential competitors in the ratings
market. 5 Nielsen responded that "[its] ratings are opinions that are protected by
the First Amendment and, thus, cannot give rise to antitrust liability."'6
Although the Supreme Court has ruled in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.,7 a case
that involved direct government restrictions on speech rather than more
indirect restrictions operating via the antitrust laws, that an information product
was speech entitled to strong First Amendment protections (the product in
question was data regarding physician pharmaceutical prescribing practices) 8,
and despite vigorous advocacy of this First Amendment-based defense to
alleged anticompetitive product design in recent years, no court has ruled on
the viability or contours of such a defense.9
2 Complaint at 1, 4, KinderStart.com LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2006
WL 3246596 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2006).
3 See id. at 5-6, 19 (arguing that Google exercised "[b]lockage" to "effectively choke[]
off search-driven traffic into the multitude of Websites owned and managed by such Class
members").
' Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint at 17 n.7, KinderStart.com, LLC v.
Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2007 WL 831806 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007).
5 See Sunbeam Television Corp. v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 1341,
1345 (S.D. Fla. 2011), aff'd, 711 F.3d 1264 (11 th Cir. 2013).
6 Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and Supporting Memorandum at 15, Sunbeam
Television Corp. v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2011)
(No. 09-60637-CIV).
7 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
8 Id. at 2659 (2011) ("Speech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing . ..is a form of
expression protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.")
I Just prior to publication of this article, S. Louis Martin v. Google (Superior Court of
Cal., County of San Francisco) (No. CGC-14-539972) was decided (Nov. 13, 2014).
Coastnews.com filed what appeared to be a pro se antitrust complaint alleging, among other
things, anticompetitive search bias. The plaintiff argued that Google's biased search results
are "Owellian [sic] and it is perjury for profit. Google should be ashamed but clearly it is
not." Id. at 5. The complaint concludes with a section entitled, "Corroboration of Experts"
that consists of quotations that are largely unrelated or tangentially related to the ostensible
legal issues. Google met its burden in demonstrating that the claims arose from
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Within the Google search engine and Nielsen ratings contexts, innovation-
based arguments also arise. Google's greatest antitrust challenge to date within
the United States arguably occurred outside of the private litigation context
and, instead, in a hearing and an investigation by Congress and the Federal
Trade Commission, respectively.' 0 Google defended its modifications of its
search engine algorithm as innovations undertaken to enhance the quality of its
product and consumer experience. 1 Nielsen has also defended its own product
redesigns as increasing their television ratings' quality, more specifically their
accuracy. 12 Nielsen has further argued that antitrust is "not supposed to be in
the business of policing the ... the quality [of a monopolist's] services."' 3 In
comparison to the relative novelty of speech-based defenses to alleged
predatory design, the law regarding innovation-based defenses with that
antitrust context is better developed, albeit substantively problematic.
"constitutionally protected activity" and, thereby, the burden shifted to Martin to
"demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits." Id. Martin filed no opposition to this
motion and "produced no evidence supporting a probability of success." The court
dismissed the complaint without leave to amend pursuant to Cal. Civ. Pro. Code 425.16.
10 The actual proceedings of the FTC's investigation are not public. Though the FTC did
issue a statement upon closing the matter without taking further action. Fed. Trade Comm'n,
FTC File No. 111-0163, Statement of the
Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google's Search Practices 1 (2013), available at http:
//www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public-statements/statement-commission-
regarding-googles-search-practices/130103brillgooglesearchstmt.pdf (addressing the closure
of the FTC's "investigation relating to allegations that Google unfairly preferences its own
content on the Google search results page and selectively demotes its competitors' content
from those results"). However, Google Executive Chairman Eric Schmidt's written
testimony submitted to the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and
Consumer Rights explicitly addresses the FTC investigation. See The Power of Google:
Serving Consumers or Threatening Competition: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on
Antitrust, Competition Policy & Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th
Cong. (2011) (statement of Eric Schmidt, Executive Chairman, Google,
Inc.), available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG- 112shrg71471, at 238-39.
" Id. at 234. The FTC's assessment, notwithstanding its closing the investigation, was
more mixed. Chairman Leibowitz observed that "some evidence suggested that Google was
trying to eliminate competition" by modifying its search engine algorithm. Chairman Jon
Leibowitz, Opening Remarks re. Google Press Conference,
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public-statements/opening-remarks-
federal-trade-commission-chairman-jon-leibowitz-prepared-
delivery/ 130103googleleibowitzremarks at 5.
12 Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and Supporting Memorandum at 1, Sunbeam
Television Corp. v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2011)
(No. 09-60637-CIV).
13 See Transcript of Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 39-41, Sunbeam
Television Corp. v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2011)
(No. 09CV60637), 2010 WL 858232, at *22 (citing Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine
Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1109, 1121 (2009)).
[Vol. 95:35
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While such speech and innovation-based defenses to antitrust actions
involving information product redesign are distinctive in their provenance and
operation, they both implicate incommensurate values and within this context
both defenses currently yield polar outcomes. If such redesigns are deemed
protected speech, then a financially and socially significant sector of the
economy would be effectively shielded from the antitrust laws. If such
redesigns are not so protected by the First Amendment, then conventional
antitrust analysis applies with no speech solicitude. This all-or-nothing
approach does not support a legal middle ground wherein the First Amendment
influences but does not trump the antitrust analysis. In a roughly analogous
manner, if the redesign is deemed a nonpretextual innovation, it is essentially
immunized regardless of its anticompetitive effect. The courts neither assess
the magnitude of any bona fide innovation, nor consider its overall competitive
consequences. Either consideration would have indicated a more nuanced
approach.
Jointly considering these speech and innovation issues is important not only
because they may both be argued in information product cases, but also
because both raise fundamental questions regarding how to navigate
incommensurate values along the interface between the First Amendment and
antitrust, as well as along the dynamic and static efficiency interface within
antitrust. 14  The difficulties associated with making tradeoffs across
incommensurate values have led both legal regimes towards de facto, and
arguably flawed, polar treatment in which legal determinations depend on the
existence, rather than the levels, of protected speech or nonpretextual
innovation, respectively.
This Article rejects these approaches as overly simplistic. Approaches that
would effectively immunize all anticompetitive speech or innovation so long
as those characteristics are not pretextual. By advocating a middle ground for
the protection of speech and the evaluation of innovation in the antitrust
context, the Article significantly departs from analyses of potentially
anticompetitive conduct involving information products offered by the antitrust
community.15 All-or-nothing positions fail to protect either First Amendment
14 Additionally, the information product context introduces a different type of
incommensurability challenge even within the comparatively more straightforward context
of merely applying the antitrust laws. While antitrust law unambiguously embraces the
importance of broadly assessing competitive effects in terms of both price and innovation
effects, antitrust's ability to actually identify and, as necessary, trade off between those
effects lags considerably.
15 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork & J. Gregory Sidak, What Does the Chicago School Teach
About Internet Search and the Antitrust Treatment of Google?, 8 J. COMPETITION L. &
EcoN. 663, 663 (2012) (conducting economic analysis on behalf of Google, but failing to
mention any First Amendment concerns); Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google
and the Limits of Antitrust: The Case Against the Case Against Google, 34 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 171, 171-72 (2011) (arguing against antitrust intervention against Google, but
without identifying free speech issues).
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rights or antitrust values; to the contrary, they openly encourage outcomes that
would undermine them. This Article introduces two complementary analytical
frameworks that directly grapple with the defining and complicating features
of speech and innovation-based defenses to antitrust actions. These
frameworks are motivated by and discussed within the context of information
products, but they have more wide-ranging application to' speech and
innovation defenses in other antitrust settings.
Part I introduces the parallel and increasingly intertwined problems plaguing
the treatment of speech and innovation in the context of potentially
anticompetitive redesigns of information products. Recent litigation and/or
investigations involving Google and Nielsen provide illustrative examples. Part
II examines the defining features of antitrust's traditional treatment of speech-
based issues and its treatment of innovation as one class of legitimate business
justifications. 16  Presently, both speech and innovation analyses are
characterized by de facto polar outcomes. Part II argues that the challenges
associated with speech and innovation issues within antitrust settings can be
addressed by recognizing the perils associated with such polar thinking and
embracing and further developing those strands of First Amendment and
innovation-related jurisprudence amenable to more nuanced analysis. Part III
recommends changes to the treatment of both speech and innovation within
antitrust settings. It stakes out a more modest approach that falls between
immunization from antitrust liability and no recognition in the case of speech,
and per se legality and no recognition of legitimate business purpose concerns
in the case of innovation. The Article concludes by revisiting the Google and
Nielsen examples and applying the recommended analytical framework to
them.
I. SPEECH AND PRODUCT REDESIGN BY PURVEYORS OF INFORMATION
Recent cases involving Google and Nielsen as information product
purveyors exemplify settings in which the speech and innovation-based aspects
of a product redesign allow for defenses against antitrust actions brought under
section 2 of the Sherman Act and section 5 of the FTC Act.' 7 Given each
firm's market power, product redesigns that generate Google's PageRank
listings and Nielsen's television audience share ratings have the potential to
affect competition.' 8 Both companies argue, in essence, that their allegedly
16 See infra notes 195-197 and accompanying text (discussing antitrust proscription of
"unreasonable" restraints of trade.)
17 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2, 45 (2012) (authorizing government action to prevent
monopolization and unfair methods of competition, respectively).
18 See Sunbeam Television Corp. v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 711 F.3d 1264, 1267
(11 th Cir. 2013) ("Neither party disputes that Nielsen exercises monopoly power over the
television audience measurement services industry, both nationally . . .and for 210 local
markets."); Jessica Lee, Google's Search Market Share Shoots Back to 67%, SEARCH
ENGINE WATCH (Aug. 16, 2013), http://searchenginewatch.com/article/2289560/Googles-
[Vol. 95:35
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anticompetitive redesigns are effectively immunized from antitrust scrutiny
because they are speech-based innovations. Either speech or innovation, the
companies claim, provides ample justification for such protection. 19 The legal
matters embroiling these companies provide both a specific focus for this
Article and a starting point for broader examination of more fundamental
policy questions.
A. Google
Countless businesses depend heavily on website traffic that flows to them
from Google's basic search engine. An algorithm at the core of Google's
search engine, known as PageRank, lists web pages to reflect their relevance to
a search query.20 The algorithm is revised continually to improve the search
engine's performance. 21 Google is the dominant firm in the search engine
market with an estimated market share of nearly seventy percent in the United
States.22 The anticompetitive potential of Google's PageRank system is fairly
direct. Numerous web-based competitors of many of Google's vertically
integrated businesses have alleged that Google has both the incentive and the
ability to injure competition by biasing its search engine to favor Google's own
interests. 23 Furthermore, even in markets in which Google does not directly
Search-Market-Share-Shoots-Back-to-67, archived at http://perma.cc/N92F-NAUB
(indicating that Google "remains the uncontested top search engine in the U.S.").
19 Sunbeam Television Corp. v. Nielsen Media Research, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1345
(S.D. Fla. 2011); KinderStart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2007 WL
831806, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No.
CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at *4 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
20 Malia Wollan, The Google Algorithm as Extinction Model, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2009,
(Magazine), at 42 ("Google's search engine uses an algorithm called PageRank to identify
the most important Web sites on a given topic by analyzing links: a Web page is important
if other important pages link to it.").
21 See L. Gordon Crovitz, Information Age: Google Search: Regulation Leads to
Innovation, WALL ST.J., Oct. 7, 2013, at A15.
22 See Lee, supra note 18 (reporting that Google has a market share of 67%, while
competitors Bing and Yahoo respectively hold 17.9% and 11.3%). But see Mark R.
Patterson, Google and Search-Engine Market Power, HARV. J.L. & TECH. OCCASIONAL
PAPER SERIES (July 2013) (providing a valuable analysis of the challenges associated with
assessing the market power of information intermediaries).
23 See The Power of Google: Serving Consumers or Threatening Competition?: Hearing
Before the S. Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy, & Consumer Rights of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 28 (2011) (statement of Sen. Michael S. Lee),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG- 11 2shrg7147 I/pdf/CHRG- 112shrg71471 .pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/RA6H-4A2T ("No other specialized business or search site can
hope to compete on anything close to a level playing field when Google uses its significant
market power to disadvantage online competitors, [creating a] clear and inherent conflict of
interest."); FAIR SEARCH, GOOGLE'S TRANSFORMATION FROM GATEWAY TO GATEKEEPER:
How GOOGLE's EXCLUSIONARY AND ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT RESTRICTS INNOVATION
AND DECEIVES CONSUMERS 2 (2011), available at http://www.fairsearch.org/wp-
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compete, it may have an incentive to bias its PageRank to favor firms paying
for special listings over firms that do not.24 Competitive concerns regarding
"search bias" have resulted in antitrust investigations across the globe,
including by Brazil, the FTC, and the European Commission.2 5 Numerous
private parties have also sued Google on multiple grounds, including antitrust.
Each of the Google matters addressed herein 2illustrates a different aspect of
the intersections of antitrust, speech, and innovation.
The FTC undertook a "wide-ranging" and "comprehensive investigation" to
examine "whether Google manipulated its search algorithms and search results
page in order to impede a competitive threat posed by vertical search
engines. '27 In January 2013, a unanimous FTC closed its "search bias"
investigation without launching a formal complaint.
2 8
content/uploads/2011 /11 /Googles-Transformation-from-Gateway-to-Gatekeeper-Edited.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/AT9Y-6G5V ("Google's competing vertical and information
content services sites give it the incentive - and its dominance in search and search
advertising gives it the ability - to exclude competition from independent sites.").
24 See, e.g., David Hatch, Google's Dominance, 21 CQ RESEARCHER 953, 960 (2011).
25 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) Rpt. Ltr. No. 1331, at 10 (Oct. 23, 2013) (discussing activities
of the Brazil Council for Economic Defense); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Google
Agrees to Change Its Business Practices to Resolve FTC Competition Concerns in the
Markets for Devices like Smart Phones, Games and Tablets, and in Online Search (Jan. 3,
2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/01/google-agrees-
change-its-business-practices-resolve-ftc, archived at http://perma.cc/H4JQ-AGZH. The
European Commission's investigation into Google's conduct opened in November 2010:
The Commission will investigate whether Google has abused a dominant market
position in online search by allegedly lowering the ranking of unpaid search results of
competing services ... (so-called vertical search services) and by according
preferential placement to the results of its own vertical search services in order to shut
out competing services. The Commission will also look into allegations that Google
lowered the 'Quality Score' for sponsored links of competing vertical search services.
The Quality Score is one of the factors that determine the price paid to Google by
advertisers.
Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Probes Allegations of Antitrust
Violations by Google (Nov. 30, 2010), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-
10-1624_en.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/UKG6-BWKA. After four years, the European
Union's competition authority's investigation remains ongoing under newly appointed
Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager. Google had tried three times, all were
unsuccessful, to arrive at a settlement with her predecessor Joaquin Alumina. James Kanter,
European Antitrust Regulators Ask for More Information in Google Investigation, N.Y.
TrMEs, Dec. 11, 2014, at Bl.
26 That is, FTC, KinderStart, and Search King.
27 FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 10, at 2.
28 Id. at 1; Edward Wyatt, US. Ends Inquiry on Web Search; Google is Victor, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 4, 2013, at Al ("The Federal Trade Commission on Thursday handed Google a
major victory by declaring, after an investigation of nearly two years, that the company had
not violated antitrust or anticompetition statutes in the way it arranges its Web search
results.").
[Vol. 95:35
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Most important for instant purposes is the FTC's treatment of innovation-
which received substantial attention in its public statement. The investigation's
focus was whether a plausible procompetitive justification (i.e., consumer
benefit) in the form of "innovation," broadly defined, existed for the algorithm
modifications at issue.29 The FTC noted that Google's search algorithm
modifications at times demoted the websites of vertical competitors while
elevating the rankings of its own offerings. 30 Nonetheless, the FTC was
satisfied that Google's justifications for those modifications, such as improved
customer experience, were "supported by ample evidence." 31 Additionally, the
FTC had "not found sufficient evidence" of manipulation to "unfairly
disadvantage" vertical competitors.32
The primary connective tissue linking the FTC's general findings regarding
the pro- and anticompetitive effects with the ultimate legal outcome was the
agency's reluctance to "second-guess a firm's product design decisions" given
the existence of amply supported procompetitive justifications.33
Unfortunately, the FTC's statement lacks any meaningful nuance regarding the
magnitudes of the various pro- or anticompetitive effects and their nexus with
the search engine modifications. 3
4
The FTC's statement does not acknowledge any First Amendment or
speech-based issues. 35 It would seem, however, that Google probably would
have advocated, or at least raised, a First Amendment defense to the FTC's
antitrust investigation. Assuming Google raised such issues, perhaps the FTC
declined to address them because the case was disposed of on other grounds.
And, in fact, that was the legal outcome to a private action KinderStart
instituted against Google; KinderStart's antitrust action was dismissed and the
First Amendment claims therein were never resolved. 36 However, in contrast to
29 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 10, at 2-3 ("[C]hanges to Google's search
algorithm could reasonably be viewed as improving the overall quality of Google's search
results ....").
30 See id. at 2. This demotion was justified in part as a response to strategies of the
vertical sites in question, which were seen to be employing tactics to manipulate the search
algorithm. See Frank Pasquale, Internet Nondiscrimination Principles: Commercial Ethics
for Carriers and Search Engines, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 263, 283-85 (describing the "black
hat" search optimization tactics and the "Google Death Penalty").
31 FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 10, at 3.
32 Id.
33 Id. (conceding that "[r]easonable minds may differ as to the best way to design a
search results page . . . ").
31 See Frank Pasquale, Paradoxes of Digital Antitrust: Why the FTC Failed to Explain Its
Inaction on Search Bias, HARV. J.L. & TECH. OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 14-16 (July 2013)
(providing thoughtful criticism regarding the FTC's investigation of Google and the
shortcomings of its public statement regarding its search bias investigation).
35 FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 10 (reviewing only innovation-based defenses).
36 KinderStart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2007 WL 831806, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (dismissing case without leave to amend).
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the secrecy surrounding the FTC's investigation, the developments in private
litigation are typically public.
KinderStart's antitrust lawsuit against Google constitutes a variation of the
FTC's inquiry. Its primary allegation was that Google removed KinderStart's
website from Google's search engine results and assigned it a PageRank of
zero.37 The result, KinderStart alleged, was a "cataclysmic fall of 70%" in its
web traffic.38 Ultimately, the district court dismissed both KinderStart's first
and second amended complaints for failing to state a cause of action on any
basis, including antitrust. 39 Though the court repeatedly reserved judgment
regarding Google's First Amendment defense, its treatment of the issue still
warrants closer consideration.
Google claimed that First Amendment-based immunity "shielded [it] from
all liability," including any antitrust liability.40 More specifically, Google
sought to analogize its conduct to that of Moody's in Jefferson County School
District v. Moody's Investor's Services, Inc.,41 wherein the Tenth Circuit found
that Moody's ranking of bonds did not constitute an "intentional interference
with contractual relations... [and] publication of an injurious falsehood"
because its ratings were found to be a "constitutionally protected expression of
opinion" and "immune from Sherman Act liability. '42 The court's decision
dismissing KinderStart's first amended complaint with leave to amend
reserved judgment regarding the speech-based defense but suggested a degree
of skepticism. 43 The court commented in a footnote that "Jefferson County
may be distinguishable because (a) Google is not a media defendant and (b)
website rankings may be of little or no public concern in comparison with
municipal bond ratings."'44 The court's decision dismissing KinderStart's
37 Complaint at 11, KinderStart.com LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2006
WL 3246596 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2006) ([T]he PageRank for Plaintiff... was at all pertinent
times calculated and assigned by Defendant Google's Toolbar as '0'.").
38 Id. at 7.
39 See KinderStart.com, LLC, 2007 WL 831806, at *24 ("Under these circumstances, the
Court concludes that there is no reasonable likelihood that KinderStart will cure the defects
in the [Second Amended Complaint] by further amendment.").
40 Defendant Google Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint,
supra note 10, at 2 (arguing for complete immunity for "Google's editorial decisions
themselves").
41 175 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999).
42 id. at 851; see also KinderStart.com, LLC, 2006 WL 3246596, at * 10 n.6 (discussing
Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist., 175 F.3d at 851).
43 See KinderStart.com LLC, 2006 WL 3246596, at * 16 ("KinderStart has not alleged
facts tending to show that Google's search engine, encompassing its index, web search
form, Results Pages and PageRank scores, [was] the 'functional equivalent of a traditional
public forum."').
44 Id. at * 10 n.6. Dismissing the second amended complaint, the District Court stated that
because it was dismissing on other grounds it did not address Google's arguments that it
was immune from suit based on either general First Amendment principles or the
[Vol. 95:35
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second amended complaint merely reserved judgment regarding whether the
page rankings were protected speech.
The court's reservation regarding the comparability of Google's website
rankings and Jefferson County's bond ratings is reasonable, though the court's
particular distinction regarding the protections afforded the press as opposed to
other speakers runs counter to a longstanding principle in American
jurisprudence that members of the press are not entitled to greater First
Amendment protection per se.45 It would seem that the more pointed and direct
divergence between KinderStart and Jefferson County concerns other, more
fundamental, features of the speech at issue.
Though not within the antitrust context, Google's argument that the First
Amendment immunized its PageRanks has enjoyed some success, for example,
in Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc.,46 in which Google was sued for
tortious interference with contractual relations and antitrust violations. The
district court's primary reference point regarding the tort claims was an
Oklahoma case involving tortious interference with prospective business
advantage. 47 The Oklahoma court's decision turned on whether or not the
holding in one tortious interference context applied to the other. The key
holdings were whether the rankings constituted opinions, and then the extent to
which being deemed an "opinion" rendered the rankings per se legal and thus
immune from the interference claim. 48 The court found that Google's
PageRanks constituted "opinion. '49 What is important here is the nuance with
which the court assessed the speech at issue. In particular, the use of the term
"opinion" can have potentially profound ramifications for legal outcomes,
because the expression of opinion receives substantial protection under the
First Amendment.
These recent examinations regarding arguably anticompetitive changes to
Google's search engine algorithm raise important questions whose answers
may have potentially profound antitrust implications. Under what
circumstances do information products constitute speech, and what measure of
First Amendment solicitude does, and should, such speech deserve? 50 How
Communications Decency Act. KinderStart.com, LLC, 2007 WL 831806, at *21 (citing the
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2012)).
45 See 3 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §22.11
(2013) (characterizing the judiciary's general refusal to provide the press with either
advantages or disadvantages not borne by non-media speakers).
46 See Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL
21464568, at *1-2 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
47 See id at *3 (discussing Gaylord Entm't Co. v. Thompson, 958 P.2d 128, 149-50
(Okla. 1998)).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Google rivals may claim, for example, that Google's (incorrectly low) page ranking of
their sites constitutes disparagement of their products or services. Disparagement as an
antitrust cause of action has received unequal treatment in federal courts. See generally
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should the antitrust system handle the tension between possible pro- and
anticompetitive effects often associated with product redesign and innovation?
These issues will be further discussed as an application of the proposed
recommendations in Part III.
B. Nielsen
Not unlike Google, Nielsen's redesign of its own information product
prompted antitrust lawsuits in which First Amendment and innovation matters
figured prominently. Nielsen generates television audience ratings that
advertisers and broadcasters use when buying and selling time slots.5 '
Nielsen's audience measurement system reflects two key methodologies: how
to develop audience samples, and how to extrapolate ratings from those
samples.52
In 2008, Nielsen replaced its older meter-diary system with its local people
meter ("LPM") system to evaluate audience size.5 3 In Sunbeam Television
Corp. v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc. , 4 Sunbeam, an owner of a local
television station that broadcasts news and entertainment programs, alleged
that its advertising revenues decreased by $1 million per month after Nielsen
introduced its LPM system.55 Sunbeam claimed that Nielsen recognized the
new system's substantial defects but, nonetheless, rushed it to market in order
to preempt competition. 56 In particular, Sunbeam claimed, Nielsen "removed"
the incentive for cable operators to "develop a competing technology by
ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 301-03 (7th ed. 2012). See,
e.g., L-3 Comm'ns Integrated Sys., L.P. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 3:07-CV-0341-B,
2008 WL 4391020, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2008) (denying defendant's summary
judgment motion in part due to defendant's failure to rely upon a presumption of de minimis
effect of disparagement); David L. Aldridge Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 995 F. Supp. 728, 749-
51 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (stating that plaintiffs must extensively rebut a presumption of a de
minimis disparagement effect, and finding that plaintiff's claim here failed (citing Am.
Prof'1 Testing Serv., Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof'l Publ'ns, Inc., 108
F.3d 1147, 1151, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d
263, 288 n.41 (2d Cir. 1979))).
51 See Television, NIELSEN,
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/solutions/measurement/television.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/832N-2MCR (last visited Oct. 12, 2014) (describing the role of Nielsen's
metrics in marketing and programming decisions).
52 Id.
13 Id. ("We measure viewing using our national and local people meters, which capture
information about what's being viewed and when, and in the major U.S. markets,
specifically who and how many people are watching."). See generally KAREN BuzzARD,
TRACKING THE AUDIENCE: THE RATINGS INDUSTRY FROM ANALOG TO DIGITAL (2012).
54 711 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2013).
55 Id. at 1268.
56 See Sunbeam Television Corp. v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 1341,
1352 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
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promising in advance that [LPMs] would lead to higher cable ratings. '57
Sunbeam's lawsuit alleged state and federal antitrust violations and other
various business torts against Nielsen.58
Nielsen did not dispute that it had market power. Instead, it argued that the
audience ratings constituted protected opinion and, as such, the ratings should
be immunized from antitrust action.59 The judge rejected this position during
oral argument. He did, however, leave open the possibility of reconsidering it
should the matter proceed beyond the motion to dismiss. 60 The judge's general
skepticism of this First Amendment-immunization defense reflected his
discomfort characterizing the ratings as opinions rather than as measurements
and his concern that a ruling that immunized Nielsen based on protected
opinion grounds would sweep too broadly. 61
The court did not revisit or resolve Nielsen's First Amendment defense
because it granted summary judgment for Nielsen on the antitrust claims. 62 Of
particular interest here is the court's analysis of the information product
redesign at issue, the LPM technology, as an exclusionary act. The court did
characterize the record as "reflect[ing] that Nielsen viewed the cable operators
as a potential competitive threat" and acknowledged that "[t]here is some
ambiguous evidence suggesting that Nielsen implemented [LPM] to stave off
that threat. '63 Ultimately, the court's ruling turned on its conclusion that
Sunbeam was unable to support its claim of the LPM's "inferiority" to the
predecessor meter-diary system.64
The court couched its specific rejection of Sunbeam's antitrust claims based
on Nielsen's product redesign in terms suggesting a more general position that
largely rejects antitrust liability associated with arguably innovative product
redesigns. The court's reluctance to meaningfully acknowledge
anticompetitive innovation as the basis for an antitrust action reflects two
pervasive and legitimate concerns. The first concern involves the system's
57 Id. at 1353.
58 See Sunbeam Television Corp., 711 F.3d at 1268. A closely related case involved
erinMedia, which claimed to be a potential entrant into the audience rating market.
ErinMedia, LLC v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
59 See Transcript of Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 39-41, Sunbeam
Television Corp., 763 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 2009 WL 8595918, at *37-39; Nielsen's Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint and Supporting Memorandum, Sunbeam Television Corp., supra
note 6, at 15 ("Those ratings are opinions that are protected by the First Amendment and,
thus, cannot give rise to antitrust liability.").
60 See Transcript of Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Sunbeam Television
Corp., supra note 59, at 41-42.
61 Id.
62 Sunbeam Television Corp., 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1343.
63 Id. at 1353.
64 Id. (stating that while Nielsen "proffered evidence supporting the claimed superiority
of [its newly introduced technology], no Sunbeam witness, fact or expert was willing to
testify that is inferior to the pre-existing [technology]").
2015]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW
relative ability or inability to adjudicate such matters. As a related matter, the
second concern involves disincentivizing innovation more generally. The
question is how to apply antitrust law in a manner that accounts for these
concerns while still ensuring the protection of competition policy values. Part
II critically assesses the manner in which antitrust has navigated those
concerns both in theory and practice.
II. ANTITRUST TREATMENT OF SPEECH AND OF INNOVATION
Part I identified important and unsettled legal questions that implicate
competition policy, speech, and legitimate business purposes in the form of
innovation. It also critiqued antitrust's ability to navigate the noneconomic and
dynamic efficiency considerations raised within the context of high-tech
information products. Given antitrust's inherent common law nature, 65 it is
particularly important to understand the modern evolution of antitrust's
treatment of speech and innovation.
American antitrust law derives largely from the Sherman Act's two primary
provisions, sections 1 and 2, which proscribe collusion and monopolization,
respectively. 66 For many decades, antitrust law has evinced an increasing
willingness to balance the pro- and anticompetitive effects of challenged
conduct and, as a corollary of sorts, a decreasing tolerance for rules
determining conduct to be illegal per se. 67 There are, however, two aspects-
oftentimes with varying magnitudes-of the information product cases at issue
whose respective analysis within antitrust cases arguably lack nuance. They are
speech and innovation.
In the information product redesign matters that Part I discussed, the First
Amendment-based defenses were raised but not resolved owing to the
65 See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)
("Congress ... did not intend the text of the Sherman Act to delineate the full meaning of
the statute or its application in concrete situations. The legislative history makes it perfectly
clear that it expected the courts to give shape to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on
common-law tradition.").
66 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to beillegal."); id § 2 ("Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony."). Another important antitrust provision, for
instant purposes, is section 5 of the FTC Act, which proscribes "unfair methods of
competition." 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). While the Federal Trade Commission does not have
direct Sherman Act authority, it can bring actions against conduct that would violate the
Sherman Act under section 5 of the FTC Act.
67 See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (stating that the Supreme Court
"presumptively applies rule of reason analysis" and has "'expressed reluctance to adopt per
se rules... "where the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious ....
(quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997))).
[Vol. 95:35
MUZZLING ANTITRUST
dismissal of the investigation or the lawsuit on antitrust grounds. Those First
Amendment questions remain largely unanswered. To begin answering those
questions, Part II analyzes the historic protection of First Amendment interests
specifically within antitrust settings-precedent that is found to be somewhat
lacking. Fortunately, by expanding its discussion of First Amendment
precedent beyond the narrow confines of antitrust matters to include
defamation and commercial speech, Part II provides a more complete
foundation for the analysis.
Under the mantle of innovation, information products are designed and
redesigned. Not all product redesigns are, however, necessarily welcomed as
procompetitive innovations. In fact, a body of precedent exists in which
purported innovations have been challenged under the antitrust laws. Despite
antitrust's longstanding commitment to protecting innovation, its treatment of
the issue remains extremely rudimentary in many regards. Towards that end,
Part II explores the tension between innovation and consumer welfare and, in
particular, the notion that innovation may have both pro- and anticompetitive
effects.
This Part's examination of antitrust law reflects several organizing
principles. First, it independently examines antitrust law's distinctive
relationships with speech and with innovation-related matters. Second, while
the speech and innovation-related discussions are separate, each reflects
antitrust law's strong propensity towards polar outcomes (i.e., effective
immunization or no recognition at all) when the value at issue (whether speech
or innovation) is not readily addressed by the price efficiency considerations
that dominate antitrust law. Third, this Part explains that despite the
increasingly default polar treatment of speech and/or innovation defenses
within antitrust contexts, substantial but underappreciated precedent exists in
both First Amendment and antitrust law that supports the more nuanced
treatment of speech and innovation within antitrust cases.
A. Speech-Based Considerations
The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech. '68 In so doing, it articulates a very powerful yet cabined
constitutional right that protects speech from government interference, but not
from private restrictions. 69 Nonetheless, even antitrust cases brought by private
parties embody the requisite government action, in the form of the underlying
antitrust legislation and the operation of the judiciary, such that a First
Amendment defense can be raised regardless of its ultimate merit.
68 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
69 See, e.g., Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to
Liberty, 59 U. CHi. L. REv. 225, 234 (1992) ("The Constitution is concerned only with the
limits on government, even though a person's autonomy may be assaulted as much if an
employer, a neighbor, or a family member silences or stops his access to speech.").
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This Section first discusses Supreme Court precedent addressing First
Amendment challenges to the Sherman Act. These cases hold that no First
Amendment solicitude at all is accorded to communications that have no
purpose other than supporting illegal activity. Additionally, the First
Amendment fully immunizes political speech when petitioning the government
regardless of any anticompetitive effects ultimately associated with it.
However, as even these seminal cases reveal, the political character of speech
interests can be ambiguous. The Court's failure to acknowledge this reality
raises significant questions regarding the appropriate constitutional protection
for more complicated speech interests. Moreover, even if such speech
complexity does not translate into more nuanced levels of constitutional
protection, it still must be channeled within a simplistic, all-or-nothing system.
In contrast to the polar outcomes typifying the First Amendment and
antitrust intersection, this Section then examines two non-antitrust contexts in
which First Amendment rights are protected through more of a middle ground
approach. The commercial advertising and defamation rulings discussed herein
illustrate both the value and viability of more nuanced approaches to First
Amendment protections. Collectively, these examples further suggest that the
legal treatment of speech within antitrust actions is arguably amenable to
greater nuance than historically applied.
This Section concludes with an examination of whether information
products constitute speech that the First Amendment protects. Two differing
viewpoints regarding whether Google's search engine results are protected
speech are contrasted. This discussion is followed by an examination of the
Supreme Court's 2011 ruling that treats data about physician drug prescribing
practices as speech. Although this case regards the sale and use of information
products as protected speech in the context of government restrictions, the
recognition of such a First Amendment defense against antitrust actions
regarding information products is an open question.
1. First Amendment and Antitrust Interface
Since its enactment in 1890, the Sherman Act has withstood numerous
speech-based challenges. More specifically, with only one exception, the First
Amendment has never been successfully invoked to modify antitrust
assessment of allegedly anticompetitive conduct. That one exception involves
political speech in the form of petitioning the government and, when present,
the antitrust laws are inapplicable.70 While most Supreme Court precedent at
'0 This exception is known as the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine. See E. R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135 (1961) ("[N]o violation of the
Act can be predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of
laws."); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965) ("Joint
efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to
eliminate competition. Such conduct is not illegal, either standing alone or as part of a
broader scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act.").
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issue either withholds any speech-based solicitude or confers outright
immunity within a given antitrust action, the limitations inherent in such a
polar approach have emerged over time.7 1
a. No Speech Solicitude
With regard to the Sherman Act's proscription of concerted or unilateral
conduct, the use of speech solely as a means to advance anticompetitive ends
will not shield the speaker from an unvarnished application of the antitrust
laws.
In Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,72 the Court easily rejected a First
Amendment challenge to a Missouri statute mirroring section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 73 The Court acknowledged that anticompetitive agreements were
generally "brought about through speaking or writing. '74 Nonetheless, it
declined to find that restrictions on those agreements violate freedom of
speech. To hold otherwise, the Court determined, would render it "practically
impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of trade .. .
Giboney and subsequent cases hold that the use of speech solely as an
instrumental mechanism to violate the law does not constitute speech
warranting First Amendment protection. 76
71 James Hurwitz offers an alternative to the Court's polar approach. See James D.
Hurwitz, Abuse of Governmental Processes, the First Amendment, and the Boundaries of
Noerr, 74 GEO. L.J. 65, 119-20 (1985) ("First amendment interests are not absolute, nor are
they all of the same magnitude .... Competition policy, therefore, merits substantial weight
in the resolution of any policy conflict, even where first amendment interests are
involved."). Hurwitz advocates for five "progressive screens" for navigating the interface
between government petitioning and antitrust law. Id. at 122-26.
72 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
73 It is quite telling that the Supreme Court had not deemed it necessary to expressly
address the "argument" that the Missouri statute's prohibition on anticompetitive refusals to
deal constituted a violation of the colluding parties' First Amendment rights. Eventually,
litigants made this rationale explicit in antitrust cases wherein plaintiffs brought a
constitutional challenge to the Sherman Act owing to what the defendants viewed as a
distinguishing feature (which, in the case of Giboney, was the labor union context).
74 Id. at 502.
75 Id.
76 See, e.g., Giboney, 336 U.S. at 502 ("[I]t has never been deemed an abridgement of
freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct
was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written,
or printed."); Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 697-98 (1978)
(Though injunctive relief may "impinge rights that would otherwise be constitutionally
protected," the First Amendment does not prevent the court from remedying the antitrust
violations.). See infra notes 303-307 and accompanying text for a more extensive discussion
of First Amendment constraints on remedial measures within the context of Nat "l Soc 'y of
Prof7 Eng'rs.
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The First Amendment has also been invoked unsuccessfully to challenge
section 2's prohibition on monopolization. Lorain Journal Co. v. United
States77 concerned the Lorain Journal's policy of denying advertising space to
any company that also advertised through a radio station serving the same
region as the journal.78 The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
decision that this policy violated section 2, and the Lorain Journal was
enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 79
Several aspects of Lorain Journal deserve emphasis. First, without more, the
mere presence of speech within the context of unilateral activity (as with
concerted activity) confers no First Amendment protection from the antitrust
laws. Second, not all conduct, even when it involves content-oriented
communication or media such as newspapers, necessarily warrants First
Amendment protection." The Court emphasized that the Lorain Journal's
proffered justifications were all wholly anticompetitive. 81 More specifically,
the newspaper offered no speech-based defense (e.g., substantive editorial
discretion exercised when reviewing advertisements for possible
publication). 82 In doing so, however, the Court implicitly suggested a messier
reality, albeit lacking in Lorain Journal, in which potentially protected speech
could be commingled with alleged anticompetitive conduct. The Court did not
further develop this analysis as dicta in Lorain Journal, nor has it significantly
done so in subsequent decades.
77 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
78 Id. at 145.
79
Id. at 144.
80 Technically, the Lorain Journal sought immunization from antitrust liability under the
First Amendment's Press Clause rather than Free Speech Clause. Id at 155. The two
arguments are interchangeable herein. The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make
no law.. . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Notwithstanding the Constitution's specific reference to "the press," it does not appear
substantially different from First Amendment rights (whether greater or lesser) that are
accorded to speakers outside the press context. SMOLLA, supra note 45, §§ 22:10, 22:12-13.
The one context in which the existence of a separate Press Clause may have some
"jurisprudential significance" concerns the frequently asserted, but not yet judicially
accepted, "reporter's privilege" that reporters raise when trying to avoid revealing
confidential information. Id. §§ 22:13, 22:17. See also Edward J. Imwinkelried, THE NEW
WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 7.5 (2014) (discussing the
widespread adoption of "so called shield laws for reporters" and noting that a reporter shield
law has been pending before Congress intermittently for more than a half dozen years).
81 See also United States v. Lorain Journal Co., 92 F. Supp. 794, 798 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
82 Id. at 798, 800-01. The newspaper tracked who advertised on the radio and then
summarily canceled their contracts to advertise in the newspaper. Id. The newspaper not
only acknowledged its anticompetitive motivation, but also sought to justify it. Id.
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b. Speech-Based Immunization
Political speech, in the form of petitioning the government, constitutes the
one context in which even unlawful anticompetitive conduct receives First
Amendment-based immunization from the antitrust laws. This Section
examines the essential constitutional values underlying this category of speech.
It also reveals that while the application of First Amendment immunization is
routinely straightforward and sufficiently protective of core First Amendment
values, when rigidly applied it lacks the capacity to navigate more complex
circumstances including those wherein ostensibly political speech occurs
outside the context of directly petitioning the government.
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.8 3
provides the seminal articulation regarding First Amendment protection of
anticompetitive petitioning. 84 The lawsuit was part of a larger struggle between
the railroad and trucking industries for economic advantage in the "long-
distance transportation of heavy freight. ' '8 5 The crux of the truckers' Sherman
Act claims against the railroads was the latter's "publicity campaign against
the truckers designed to foster the adoption and retention of laws and law
enforcement practices destructive of the trucking business. 8 6
The Court summarily dismissed the antitrust action as violating the First
Amendment, specifically the right to petition the government. 87 It held that the
Sherman Act does not prohibit individual or collective efforts to persuade the
government to enact legislation or take action "that would produce a restraint
or a monopoly. '8 8 Moreover, the presence of economic self-interest on the part
of the petitioners was deemed irrelevant for purposes of First Amendment
protection. The Court concluded that to hold otherwise would be perverse. If
economic self-interest disqualifies one from taking public positions, then the
government would be deprived of "a valuable source of information" and the
people would be deprived of "their right to petition in the very instances in
which that right may be of the most importance to them." 89
But what if the speech at issue in an antitrust action was part of a
government boycott? Such political speech is closely related to petitioning in
that the target of the speech is the same, though the speech's operation may be
more indirect. An important line of cases concerning political speech and
antitrust involves economic boycotts ostensibly organized to influence
legislators, but not necessarily directed at them. The issue became whether,
and ultimately which, boycotts warrant immunization from antitrust scrutiny.
83 365 U.S. 127 (1961)
84 For a thoughtful discussion of Noerr, see generally Hurwitz, supra note 71.
85 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 128.
86 Id. at 129.
87 Id. at 139-40.
88 Id. at 136.
9 Id. at 139.
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These indirect political boycotts cases delineate a binary outcome system for
judicial decisionmaking in which fact patterns are divided into two outcome
categories.90 Namely, when boycotters' interests are deemed political, they are
immunized. When the boycotters are economically self-interested, their
interests are not considered political and, therefore, they are subject to the full
force of the antitrust laws. But the Supreme Court's rulings themselves
suggest, and perhaps even explicitly raise, the insufficiency of this simplistic
approach. Due to its extreme terms, the Court's polar approach cannot
accommodate more complex realities in which the boycotters' mixed motives
include economic self-interests as well as noneconomic or political interests. 91
Noerr and its progeny conferred antitrust immunity for political speech in
the form of direct government petitioning whether the targeted audience was
the legislature (as in Noerr itself), or the judiciary,92 the executive, 93 or
administrative agencies. 94 An important challenge regarding the boundaries of
this immunization category concerned "economically tooled" boycotts as
illustrated by Missouri v. National Organization for Women (NOW). 95 The
National Organization for Women organized a boycott of Missouri's
convention industry to pressure the state to support adoption of the then
90 In a binary outcome system, the assignment of a fact pattern to one or the other
category determines the outcome for that fact pattern. This system contrasts with one in
which assignment of a fact pattern to a category determines the appropriate analysis for the
fact pattern, but not the ultimate outcome. The constitutionality of a specific government
restriction on speech, for example, is analyzed under different criteria depending on whether
the speech is classified as commercial or political.
91 See generally Hillary Greene, Antitrust Censorship of Economic Protest, 59 DUKE L.J.
1037 (2010) [hereinafter Greene, Antitrust Censorship]; Kay P. Kindred, When First
Amendment Values and Competition Policy Collide: Resolving the Dilemma of Mixed-
Motive Boycotts, 34 ARiz. L. REV. 709 (1992).
92 See, e.g., Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49,
57 (1993) (holding that "an objectively reasonable effort to litigate cannot be sham
regardless of subjective intent" and thus such litigation is entitled to antitrust petitioning
immunity); Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972)
("[T]he right to petition extends to all departments of the Government. The right of access to
the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.").
93 United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 671 (1965) ("The conduct
of the union and the operators did not violate the Act, the action taken to set a minimum
wage for government purchases of coal was the act of a public official who is not claimed to
be a co-conspirator, and the jury should have been instructed, as UMW requested, to
exclude any damages which Phillips may have suffered as a result of the Secretary's Walsh-
Healey determinations.").
94 Cal. Motor Transp. Co., 404 U.S. at 510 ("The same philosophy [underlying the
Court's decision in Noerr] governs the approach of citizens or groups of them to
administrative agencies (which are both creatures of the legislature, and arms of the
executive) .... ").
" 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980).
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pending Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.96 NOW constituted
a case of first impression because the circumstances at issue differed so
substantially from the more direct government petitioning that had historically
received immunization from the antitrust laws. 97
In NOW, the Eighth Circuit held that First Amendment immunity fully
protected the boycott as political petitioning; the court also heavily emphasized
the organizer's absence of economic self-interest in the boycott.98 The court's
reliance on "government petitioning" to immunize the conduct was
inconsistent with its intense focus on parsing the presence or absence of
economic interests of the boycotters. As the Supreme Court held unequivocally
in Noerr, government petitioning is immunized from the antitrust laws
regardless of economic self-interest. 99
The NOW ruling reflected the desire to subsume government boycotts
within the category of speech immunized from antitrust; but, in contrast to
direct governmental petitioning, boycotts would be subject to further analysis
regarding motivation (the presence or complete absence of economic self-
interest). As it applied to economic boycotts with ultimately political targets,
the availability of First Amendment protection entailed a more searching
inquiry, but it retained an all-or-nothing character. In sum, NOW expanded the
category of immunized speech, but this immunity still retains an all-or-nothing
character.
NOW implicitly raised a critical question: What, if any, First Amendment
solicitude extends to defendants in antitrust actions whose alleged
anticompetitive activity is a boycott in which the defendants arguably harbor a
combination of political (non-economic) and economic interests? The Supreme
Court addressed this question in FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass 'n.100
The Court rejected the First Amendment defense of a boycott undertaken by a
group of the trial lawyers, because the Court deemed the action to be an
economically motivated effort by market participants to increase their
compensation.' 0 1 While no member of the Court advocated immunizing the
boycotters, the Justices strongly disagreed as to whether the First Amendment
required some form of solicitude or no solicitude at all in the application of the
antitrust law. The majority held, in effect, that the boycotters' economic self-
interest stripped them of any First Amendment protection at all, and thus their
conduct was condemned after a traditional application of the antitrust laws. 0 2
96 Id. at 1302.
97 Id. at 1304.
98 id. at 1314 ("[T]he crux of the issue is that NOW was politically motivated to use a
boycott to influence ratification of the ERA. [The boycott] was not a mere sham to cover up
an attempt to interfere with the business relationship of a competitor.").
99 E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 139 (1961).
100 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
101 Id. at 426.
102 Id. at 432.
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Several aspects of Superior Court Trial Lawyers are particularly
noteworthy. The majority's decision to withhold any First Amendment
solicitude appeared to heavily reflect its concern regarding the inability of
establishing any viable intermediate treatment. More specifically, the majority
held that to offer some First Amendment solicitude would "create a gaping
hole in the fabric" of the antitrust laws.'03 This all-or-nothing approach clearly
reflects factors other than the absence of a reasonable alternative given the
dissent's recommendation of applying a traditional antitrust analysis with the
rule of reason. 104 Such a rule of reason analysis, in contrast to per se illegality,
would obviously entail the more searching legal inquiry which typifies
virtually all other antitrust questions, but the underlying antitrust analysis
would not have incorporated any First Amendment solicitude. Boycotts found
to be unlawful anticompetitive conduct under the rule of reason would then be
condemned. As such, owing to the unique facts characterizing Superior Court
Trial Lawyers, the First Amendment solicitude could have taken the form, as
the dissent advocated, of merely applying traditional competitive analysis
rather than a truncated form under a per se rule.'0 5 The majority's decision,
therefore, is particularly revealing in its persistent reluctance to meaningfully
address some of the difficult questions attendant to speech-based defenses to
antitrust actions.
While the outcome in Superior Court Trial Lawyers was arguably
substantively misguided, it was in other regards consistent with the Court's
antitrust approach regarding noneconomic factors including First Amendment
considerations. 0 6 Stated alternatively, there was arguably an inability, as well
as an abiding reluctance, to generate an outcome representing a middle ground
that would accommodate both First Amendment and antitrust values.10 7
103 Id. at 431-32.
104 Id. at 438-39 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[W]hen
applying the antitrust laws to a particular expressive boycott, the government may not
presume an antitrust violation under the per se rule, but must instead apply the more
searching, case-specific rule of reason.").
105 Id. at 437 ("Because I believe that the majority's decision is insensitive to the
venerable tradition of expressive boycotts as an important means of political
communication, I respectfully dissent from Part V of the Court's opinion.").
06 For a more comprehensive and critical analysis of the Court's treatment of
noneconomic factors in antitrust cases including, specifically, NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), and Superior Court Trial Lawyers, see Greene,
Antitrust Censorship, supra note 91, at 1052-54 (arguing that "noneconomic considerations
have fallen into disregard").
107 Costs are also created when a particular type of case shapes the treatment the law or
key prosecutors give to a class of cases that may differ significantly from this "archetypical"
case. See, e.g., Hillary Greene, Patent Pooling Behind the Veil of Uncertainty: Antitrust,
Competition Policy, and the Vaccine Industry, 90 B.U. L. REv. 1397, 1448 (2010)
(discussing that acceptable characteristics for patent pools were determined by standard-
setting pool, which have quite different characteristics than patent pools that do not involve
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Perhaps no case better illustrates the consequences of the Court's stark all-
or-nothing approach than understanding what would have been its implications
for the Court's earlier decision in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,10 8
which it decided just eight years before Superior Court Trial Lawyers.
Superior Court Trial Lawyers holds that political boycotts are immunized. By
contrast, non-political boycotts receive no First Amendment solicitude at all.
Notably, political boycotts are defined, in significant part, by the absence of
economic self-interest. 1°9
Claiborne Hardware Co. involved a boycott organized largely by the
NAACP against white merchants in Claiborne County to pressure local
officials to accede to "demands for racial equality and integration."'" 0 The
white merchants sued, claiming, among other things, that the boycott violated
Mississippi's antitrust statute."' 1 The Mississippi Supreme Court held that
"boycotts to achieve political ends are not a violation of the Sherman Act, after
which [Mississippi's] statute is patterned." 1 2 Though the antitrust issue itself
was not raised in the ensuing appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a seminal
ruling affirming the boycotters' First Amendment immunity.
The U.S. Supreme Court discussed at great length the political and non-
economic character of the boycotters' motivations. It noted, for example,
"[tihere is no suggestion that" any of the defendants competed with the "white
businesses" being boycotted or that they were motivated by "parochial
economic interests."' 13 Such statements were incorrect and, it would seem, the
Court would have understood their inaccuracy even at the time. 14 Perhaps the
Court's over-simplification of some boycotters' interests reflected its concern
that acknowledging economic interests would undermine the First Amendment
solicitude available including, of course, immunization. 1 5
standard setting).
108 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
109 Greene, Antitrust Censorship, supra note 91, at 1066.
110 Id. at 889.
111 Id. at 889-92.
112 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 393 So.2d 1290, 1301 (Miss. 1980) (citation
omitted).
13 Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 915.
114 Greene, Antitrust Censorship, supra note 91, at 1061-62 (discussing the information
before the Court regarding the boycotters' varied economic interests).
115 Id. at 1063. See, e.g., 1B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 191 (3d ed. 2006)
(arguing that a First Amendment defense "should be denied in the Claiborne Hardware
situation," wherein a merchant involved in the boycott benefits directly from a decreased
business of the boycott targets). Elaborating upon this position, Hovenkamp argues that a
presumptive denial of First Amendment protection "should be defeated only when the
economic motives appear trivial in comparison with clearly established political motives."
Id. at 194. Willard K. Tom arguing before the Court, on behalf of the Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Association, ostensibly concluded that the Claiborne Hardware boycotters would
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While the boycotts themselves were very different, the defendants in both
Claiborne Hardware and Superior Court Trial Lawyers invoked a First
Amendment-based defense to antitrust complaints. The challenge for courts
when evaluating this defense stems from the presence of political and
economic motives amongst at least some, if not all, of the boycotters. In
particular, when a court applies a binary approach to facts that reveal a
significantly more complex reality, and when the availability of a legal middle
ground is undeniable, as in Superior Court Trial Lawyers, the cost imposed on
society would seem unnecessary.
This Section began with ostensibly straightforward cases in which, given the
purely instrumental nature of the speech interest, First Amendment rights were
not implicated and, therefore, straightforward applications of the antitrust laws
were warranted. Lorain Journal in particular, however, implicitly raises
questions regarding the role of the First Amendment when more complicated
speech interests are at issue. Similar questions arose within the context of the
First Amendment's immunization of political speech in the form of traditional
government petitioning. The limits of this all-or-nothing approach were
apparent within the context of boycotts wherein the Court's adherence to a
polar approach appears to require either disregarding bona fide speech interests
(Superior Court Trial Lawyers) or immunizing speech interests only by
consciously disregarding certain complicating characteristics (Claiborne
Hardware). Either outcome is clearly sub-optimal, and either has the potential
to undermine the legal discourse regarding these matters more broadly.
Particularly when a legal decision rule is all-or-nothing and applies to complex
values and rights that do not neatly correspond to the rule's binary nature,
more nuanced decisions are necessarily taking place. Unfortunately, such
nuance remains unacknowledged to avoid triggering an outcome that the court
disfavors. It is unclear that courts fully take that reality into account when
dismissing imperfect legal middle grounds as replacements to all-or-nothing
analysis.
2. First Amendment Interfaces in Non-Antitrust Contexts
The foregoing discussion identified non-immunized speech such as price
fixing (no First Amendment solicitude) and immunized speech such as
government petitioning (absolute First Amendment protection) as two extreme
points on the First Amendment and antitrust spectrum. This Section examines
two non-antitrust contexts in which the Supreme Court created more nuanced
legal standards to better protect the First Amendment as well as other,
potentially conflicting, values. The first example concerns commercial speech,
i.e., advertising, for which the Court explicitly adopts an "intermediate"
not receive First Amendment solicitude under the FTC's position that the Court ultimately
adopted. Transcript of Oral Argument, FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493
U.S. 411 (1990) (No. 88-1198), available at http://www.oyez.com/cases/1980-
1989/1989/1989_88_1198/argument, archived at http://perma.cc/8473-GJ4G.
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approach. More specifically, government restrictions on commercial speech
are subject to a unique level of constitutional review, intermediate scrutiny, in
contrast to either strict or rational basis scrutiny. The second example concerns
defamatory speech and the adoption of a "conditional privilege" if a certain
condition is met, i.e., no actual malice by the speaker. This approach to
defamation contrasts with recognizing an absolute privilege or no privilege at
all. While these two examples differ from the antitrust circumstances at issue
herein, they represent important examples wherein the Court transcended
unduly simplistic approaches to protecting speech.
a. Commercial Speech
Throughout much of the twentieth century, "commercial speech" received
little or no direct First Amendment solicitude in the context of government
restrictions. In particular, earlier in the century, several Supreme Court cases
expressly rejected any such constitutional protection."16 Over time, even
though the Court did not champion First Amendment protection for
commercial speech, it avoided reaffirming the exclusion of commercial speech
from protection. In 1976, the Court explicitly held in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.'1 7 that commercial
speech, in the form of unadorned advertising, deserved some measure of First
Amendment protection. The case invalidated a state law prohibiting certain
advertising by pharmacies.' 18
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy introduced several key themes that would
receive further amplification in later years. The Court recognized that the
economy's operation is clearly a matter of vital importance and political
significance to society, and that the exchange of commercial information is
critical to the functioning of economic actors." 9 It observed, moreover, that
individuals may at times find information regarding commercial goods to be as
important as, or more important than, political discourse.120 The importance of
commercial speech is a function of multiple interests: the speakers (sellers), the
116 See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) ("[T]he streets are proper
places for the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating
opinion .... [T]he Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely
commercial advertising.").
117 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
118 Id. at 773.
1"9 See id. at 765 ("So long as we preserve a predominately free enterprise economy,...
[i]t is a matter of public interest that [the allocation of economic resources], in the
aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial
information is indispensable.").
120 See id at 763 ("As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of
commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest
in the day's most urgent political debate.").
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potential audience (buyers), and society as a whole.' 21 While acknowledging
the immense importance of commercial speech, the Court also established its
subordinate position in the First Amendment hierarchy. The First Amendment
provided a basis for "insuring that the stream of commercial information
flow[s] cleanly as well as freely," but such speech receives a different, lesser,
standard of protection. 22
The commercial speech standard received its seminal articulation in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York. 123
The majority further emphasized many of the general themes characterizing
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy.124 Central Hudson's most important
contribution, however, lay in its delineation of an intermediate scrutiny
framework.
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by
the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that
provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.
Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If
both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.125
Intermediate scrutiny is an additional treatment category applicable to the
constitutional analysis of government restrictions on speech. Through
development of this category, the Court recognized that commercial speech
can be vital to society, and at the same time imposed some limits on when that
speech enjoys First Amendment protection. The success of this intermediate
approach would depend on developing a workable definition of "commercial
speech" and a workable form of intermediate scrutiny.126
As always, the lines drawn within one case almost invariably spawn further
litigation to identify where the line falls in more ambiguous cases.' 27 What
121 See id. at 762-65.
122 Id. at 772.
123 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
124 Id. at 561-62. It should be noted that the Court's ruling was fractured-resulting in a
majority opinion by Justice Blackmun, two concurring opinions (Burger, C.J. and Stewart,
J.), as well as a dissent (Rehnquist, J.).
125 Id. at 566.
126 See Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV.
1, 7 (2000) ("[T]he impossibility of specifying the parameters that define the category of
commercial speech has haunted its jurisprudence and scholarship.").
127 An example of such a case is State University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469
(1989). This case involved a prohibition on commercial speech in state university
dormitories. The speech at issue, essentially Tupperware parties, involved both commercial
and noncommercial speech. Notwithstanding the presence of both types of speech, the Court
applied the commercial speech legal standard to the speech in its entirety. Id. at 474
(rejecting that "pure speech and commercial speech are 'inextricably intertwined,' and that
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would become a long-simmering debate regarding what constitutes a
"substantial government interest" (the second prong of intermediate scrutiny)
arose with regard to severe restrictions on truthful and non-deceptive
information undertaken for what is deemed paternalistic purposes. This Article
will discuss the intermediate scrutiny standard subsequently when considering
the Supreme Court's 2011 ruling in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.
b. Defamatory Speech
A second context that exemplifies the amenability of even the most strongly
held First Amendment rights to protection through middle ground schemes
concerns defamation. It has long been recognized that "[f]reedom of speech is,
as it always has been, freedom to tell the truth and comment fairly upon
facts .... "128 But the laws of libel underscore the reality that some speech falls
woefully short of those standards. Typically, statements were actionable if the
speech was a "defamatory false statement of fact" that "causes the plaintiff loss
of reputation." 129 But what if that defamation occurs within the context of
speech regarding the conduct of a public official and his execution of his
public duty? Should that speaker receive no First Amendment solicitude and be
subjected to the unvarnished application of libel law? Should that speaker be
fully immunized by the First Amendment? Or, does the First Amendment
permit the application of libel law subject to certain additional restrictions?
The seminal case regarding defamation is New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan. 130 This case is particularly instructive for instant purposes because the
Court not only introduced a new legal standard that represented a middle
ground between immunization and no solicitude, but also it did so on what the
Court described as a "clean slate." 131 Between the Court's majority and
concurring opinions and the Alabama Supreme Court's decision, three very
different positions on the spectrum were explored.
While Sullivan's impact has been far-reaching, for instant purposes, a focus
upon the particulars of the case itself is necessary. The plaintiff, L. B. Sullivan,
was the Commissioner of Public Affairs, an elected position, and his duties
included supervising the police department. 132 A one-page advertisement, run
in the New York Times, was found to be "libelous per se," and as such, the trial
court instructed the jury that general damages were presumed.133 The trial
court did not charge the jury that malice, in the sense of "actual intent," was
required for an award of punitive damages, nor did the court require the jury's
the entirety must therefore be classified as noncommercial").
128 See Sweeney v. Schenectady Union Pub. Co., 122 F.2d 288, 290-91 (2d Cir. 1941).
129 SMOLLA, supra note 45, § 23:1.
130 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
131 Id. at 299.
132 Id. at 256.
133 Id. at 262.
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verdict to distinguish punitive from compensatory damages.134 The Alabama
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court in all respects. 135
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed Alabama's high court. It held that the
First Amendment prohibits public officials from "recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct" unless the official proves
it was made 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." 136 In so doing, the Court
established a "conditional privilege" because it served to "immuniz[e] honest
misstatements of fact." 137 Moreover, the Court placed the burden of
establishing both falsity and malice on the plaintiff and not the defendant.
Having articulated the proper rule of law, the majority then applied that law
and found, as a matter of law, there was no basis for finding actual malice. 38
Despite the precedential strength that Sullivan has acquired over the
decades, it is useful to recognize the dissension in the Court when the case was
first decided. The Court's decision included two concurrences (endorsed by
three Justices collectively). Each of the two concurrences rejected the
majority's "actual malice" standard. 139 More specifically, all of the concurring
Justices advocated immunization rather than a conditional privilege for the
defendants who they believed enjoyed "absolute, unconditional constitutional
right[s]" with regard to the speech that criticized the city's agencies and
officials. 140
Before further addressing disagreement between the Supreme Court's
majority and concurring Justices, the one central point of agreement warrants
recognition: "[E]rroneous statement is inevitable . . . . [I]t must be protected if
the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need...
to survive."'' 141 As a practical matter, of course, this means that false and even
defamatory speech regarding governmental figures made without malicious
intent is protected. A speaker is not found guilty of defaming public figures if
the speaker believed, albeit erroneously, that his or her speech was truthful and
the speaker did not evince a reckless disregard for the truth. 142 This reflects the
Court's concern that aggressively punishing false speech would chill non-false
speech, and that in certain circumstances, the benefits of ensuring a less
constrained public debate exceed the costs of non-malicious false speech. 143
134 Id. at 262-63.
135 Id. at 263.
136 Id. at 280.
137 Id. at 298, 282 n.21.
138 Id. at 286.
139 Id. at 267.
140 Id. at 293 (Black, J., concurring).
141 Id. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,433 (1963)).
142 Id.
143 See id. at 284-85.
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This compromise position, which creates another treatment category for
speech in the defamation context, underscores the need for a comprehensive
understanding of a liability rule's effect on speech, including potential chilling
effects, and shows that the Court recognizes some hierarchy of speech
protection even in the most protected category of political speech. But without
conditional privilege, this treatment category receives a polar analysis.
The key dispute among the Justices was whether the majority's position was
sufficiently protective of the speech at issue. One virtue of polar outcomes is
simplicity. And, depending upon how one defines the relevant categories, one
can easily guide the law toward being more or less protective of a given value.
The difficulty is that almost by necessity, middle grounds demand more
nuanced analysis. In Sullivan, the requirement of malice provided that
additional nuance. Justice Black's concurring opinion, joined by Justice
Douglas, opined, "'Malice,' even as defined by the Court, is an elusive,
abstract concept, hard to prove and hard to disprove."' 144 As a practical matter,
they did not believe that the majority's legal formulation of malice that was
intended to protect the First Amendment would in fact do so.145 As Justice
Black stated: "Stopgap measures like those the Court adopts are in my
judgment not enough."'1 46 Justice Goldberg, joined by Justice Douglas,
forcefully echoed this criticism, rejecting the notion that "freedom of speech
which all agree is constitutionally protected can be effectively safeguarded by
a rule allowing the imposition of liability upon a jury's evaluation of the
speaker's state of mind."'147
The adoption of these legal middle grounds regarding restrictions on
advertising and defamation of public officials demonstrates the viability of
more nuanced positions that transcend an all-or-nothing approach. These
examples also highlight that developing any particular approach is an art as
much as a science, and that any test developed will continue to be plagued by
some of the same tensions that gave rise to its development in the first place.
As such, the value of an intermediate approach is a function of a determination
regarding the harm of a polar approach coupled with the practical contribution
of the intermediate approach.
144 Id. at 293 (Black, J., concurring).
145 Id. at 295.
146 Id. (advocating "granting the press absolute immunity for criticism of the way public
officials do their public duty").
141 -d. at 300 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg accepted that any legal
standard would contain "a gray area"; however, he sought to distinguish between shades of
gray, as it were. For example, he would only extend immunity to speech regarding official
conduct but not to that of a government official's private conduct. He believed the public-
private distinction to be fundamentally different and less difficult than drawing distinctions
between malicious and non-malicious states of mind. Id. at 302 n.4.
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3. First Amendment and Information Products
Legal precedent regarding the First Amendment and antitrust interface has
not directly addressed the questions associated with the information product
redesigns this Article addresses. Moreover, the core holdinis within that
precedent cannot be easily imported and unambiguously applied to this
different context. Perhaps nothing better reinforces these two assessments
regarding the limitations of existing legal precedent than a review of some of
the most prominent arguments that, whether explicitly or implicitly, reveal the
shortcomings of that precedent. The first claim, the absence of direct judicial
guidance, is buttressed by the inability of others to identify directly applicable
case law. The second claim, the existence of significant limitations to merely
importing and readily applying what relevant precedent does exist, is reflected
in the shortcomings in arguments by advocates seeking to do just that. Towards
that end, this Article examines two thoughtful white papers advocating very
different positions regarding First Amendment-based defenses within the
context of antitrust treatment of search engine bias. Each suggests the presence
of controlling precedent that clearly, if not inexorably, leads to their respective
positions. Both of these white papers are misguided and, unfortunately,
potentially misleading.
Part II concludes with a discussion of the 2011 Supreme Court ruling that
directly addressed whether information that identifies users of a product
(medical doctor prescribing patterns), a quintessential information product as
defined herein, constitutes speech. While constituting an important First
Amendment point of reference, the decision ultimately raises as many
questions as it resolves for the purposes of antitrust law.
a. A View from the Trenches
Professor Eugene Volokh and attorney Donald M. Falk, in a Google-
sponsored white paper, argue that "search engines are speakers" whose
decisions are entitled to First Amendment immunity. 48 The white paper
specifically addresses competition policy considerations in a section whose
title summarizes the authors' conclusion: "The First Amendment Protects
Search Engine Results Against Antitrust Law."' 149
What support do Volokh and Falk offer for their position that "antitrust
law ... may not be used to control what speakers say or how they say it"? 50
They begin by invoking the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine and citing Supreme
Court rulings to support relatively general notions, including the unexceptional
proposition that the Sherman Act should be interpreted "in the light of the First
Amendment[]."' 151 As discussed, Noerr concerns core political speech, namely,
148 Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google: First Amendment Protection for Search
Engine Search Results, 8:4 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 883, 884 (2011-2012).
149 Id. at 895.
150 Id.
151 Id. (citation omitted).
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the right to petition the government. It immunizes an entire speech category,
government petitioning, from the antitrust laws even when the speech is
blatantly anticompetitive. 152 The doctrine neither illustrates nor invites legal
nuance. It reflects a categorical determination and, depending upon whether
the speech falls inside or outside the category, the speech receives
immunization or no speech solicitude. Unfortunately, Volokh and Falk only
reinforce such a polar approach and, more importantly, they fail to explain why
the speech at issue should fall into the "all" or immunization category.
The white paper's treatment of two seminal antitrust cases involving
newspapers is equally unavailing. In both Associated Press v. United States153
and Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court unequivocally
held that decisions by newspapers regarding content are subject to antitrust
scrutiny and, ultimately, condemnation. In Associated Press, for example, the
bylaws of the news-gathering organization "hindered and restrained the sale of
interstate news to non-members who competed with members.' 54 The Court
concluded that "[i]t would be strange indeed, however, if the grave concern for
freedom of the press which prompted adoption of the First Amendment should
be read as a command that the government was without power to protect that
freedom."1 55
The Court squarely addresses and rejects the appeal to unfettered editorial
discretion to invalidate the remedial measure on First Amendment grounds.
While the newspapers' substantive editorial discretion regarding the generation
of news stories warrants First Amendment protection, no such protection
extends to anticompetitive conduct cloaked under the mantle of legitimate
discretion. Similarly, in Lorain Journal, as discussed previously, the Court
applied the antitrust laws without any First Amendment solicitude owing to the
Lorain Journal's failure to proffer any defense reflecting editorial
discretion. 156 Both of these cases represent straightforward examples of strictly
anticompetitive undertakings. Neither case supports the proposition that if just
any editorially based justification had been proffered, then it would have
constituted a speech interest warranting First Amendment solicitude if not
immunization. 57
152 See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
153 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
154 Id. at 13.
151 ld. at 20.
156 Supra note 82 (discussing the Lorain Journal's non-defense).
157 Two additional First Amendment cases, also involving newspapers, are still more
inapposite. Though each is only briefly discussed, Volokh and Falk note that the newspapers
were alleged to have considerable market power ("a virtual monopoly" or "substantial
monopoly"). Volokh & Falk, supra note 148, at 896. One concerned the rejection of the
proposition that a newspaper allegedly holding a local monopoly could be considered to be
essentially a quasi-governmental organization whose speech-restricting actions could then
be challenged under the First Amendment. Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co.,
440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971). The second case carried only narrow significance because,
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Attorney Kurt Wimmer, whose clients include Microsoft, wrote what is
effectively a response to Volokh and Falk's white paper.1 58 Wimmer rejects the
position that speech generated by search engines is immunized from the
antitrust laws. 159 He argues that such speech is "commercial speech" and,
consistent with intermediate scrutiny, that it is both properly subject to the
antitrust laws and, moreover, as a practical matter it warrants no First
Amendment solicitude.160 What, if any, legal precedent does Wimmer claim as
support? Unfortunately, like Volokh and Falk, Wimmer neither acknowledges
nor grapples with the limitations of existing precedent, and the positions he
advocates suffer accordingly.
While Wimmer notes the ambiguity surrounding what constitutes
"commercial speech," he nonetheless concludes that "Google's search results
are plainly commercial speech.' 61 The basis for this assertion is unclear. By
its very terms, Wimmer's own discussion of relevant precedent reveals the de
facto equation of "commercial speech" with advertising. However, the core
antitrust allegation against Google is that it biases non-sponsored search results
to advantage itself and to disadvantage its competitors. 62 Wimmer merely
asserts that such competitive manipulation "also constitutes a form of
commercial speech."' 63 He does not cite any authority, nor does he extrapolate
from any holding that "commercial speech" should be interpreted to include
the alleged information manipulation. This is an important point to address,
because the contours of the commercial speech doctrine need to be established
with reference to the more complex realities characterizing the matters this
Article discusses.
The significance of Wimmer's characterization of the speech as
"commercial" flows from the consequences of such a designation for First
Amendment protection. As discussed, the constitutionality of governmental
among other features, the alleged anticompetitive conduct was protected under the
Newspaper Preservation Act. Newspaper Printing Corp. v. Galbreath, 580 S.W.2d 777
(Tenn. 1979). The white paper itself reveals the absence of legal precedent when both
speech and competition policy interests are present. Volokh & Falk, supra note 148, at 896.
158 Kurt Wimmer, The Proper Standard for Constitutional Protection of Internet Search
Practices (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.mediacompolicy.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/296/2012/06/First-Amendment-lssues-in-Search-and-Antitrust-6-
2.pdf, archived at http://perma.ccV9BE-78TU (arguing that Google's search practices do
not deserve First Amendment protection under the intermediate scrutiny standard
appropriate for commercial speech).
159 Id. at 20 ("[Tlhe First Amendment ... cannot be played as a trump card to insulate
[manipulation of search results] from scrutiny.").
160 Id. at 1. Wimmer does, however, argue that imposing liability for proven antitrust
violations "would support rather than undermine First Amendment values." Id.
161 Id. at 13.
162 Id. Google has been criticized for practices associated with its "sponsored search
results," which Wimmer characterizes as "unquestionably advertisements." Id.
163 Id. (emphasis added).
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restrictions on commercial speech is subject to "intermediate scrutiny."
Wimmer restates the appropriate Central Hudson standard and argues that the
antitrust regulation of Google's allegedly anticompetitive search practices
meets this standard. 164 He refers to no instances in which the courts have
analyzed antitrust law's constitutionality in terms of either commercial speech
or intermediate scrutiny. Moreover, his own application of the intermediate
scrutiny test is oddly truncated. Despite having restated the multi-prong test,
Wimmer only addresses the first prong: whether the restriction at issue reflects
a "substantial government interest.' 65 Moreover, he references no precedent
addressing this first prong notwithstanding the fact that this "intermediate
scrutiny" standard was introduced in 1980.166
Further, assuming arguendo the existence of a significant government
interest, it does not then follow that the traditional application of antitrust is
warranted. Intermediate scrutiny entails further analysis including
consideration of whether "the restriction is proportional to the interest .... ,,167
The speech at issue may warrant limited First Amendment protection, and the
antitrust laws may reflect a substantial government interest, but it may also be
that the appropriate outcome is a heretofore absent middle ground, which this
Article proposes.
Of course, many scholars advocate still different positions regarding the
First Amendment issues associated with search engines or software algorithms
more generally. 168 The white papers discussed, however, are unique in their
treatment of the First Amendment as a defense to antitrust actions. Consider,
for example, Professor Stuart Benjamin, who, albeit with apparent reluctance,
concludes that "algorithm-based outputs" such as Google's search engine
constitute protected speech under the First Amendment. 169 To conclude
"6 Wimmer, supra note 158, at 13 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)).
165 See id.
166 Wimmer relies upon two quotations, from President Barak Obama and FCC
Chairman Julius Genachowski, discussing, respectively, the central importance of the
Internet to "small businesses and individual entrepreneurs" and that "no central authority,
public or private" should control the outcome of that marketplace. Id. at 14.
167 Id. at 13.
168 Professor Dan Burk's Patenting Speech constitutes one of the earliest and most
thoughtful examinations of whether software constitutes speech entitled to First Amendment
protection. Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99 (2000). It warrants specific
attention herein owing to Burk's treatment of the interplay between the consequences of
First Amendment protection for different legal regimes (patent and copyright). In his
article's penultimate paragraph, Burk thoughtfully concludes, albeit without further
elaboration, that a "sensible" approach to navigating the hybrid nature of software
(functional and expressive) would be to provide software its "own novel brand of
intellectual property protection" and its "own category of protection" under the First
Amendment. Id. at 161.
169 Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms as Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445, 1471 (2013).
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otherwise, he argues, would require "upending existing case law" and require
radical changes to First Amendment doctrine. 170 He finds no principled basis
upon which to do so under current law, although he does recognize that "an
enormous and growing amount of activity" will receive strong First
Amendment protection "absent a fundamental reorientation of First
Amendment jurisprudence."'171 He proposes one possible category of
algorithm-based speech that might be excluded from First Amendment
protection in the future, namely, "outputs that do not reflect human
decisionmaking."1 72
Benjamin's valuable discussion, however, is devoid of any antitrust
treatment. In fact, to date nearly all academic treatments have addressed First
Amendment issues regarding search engines or algorithms with a "rights for
robots"'173 framework of analysis. One consequence of that perspective appears
to be that antitrust matters fall beyond the scope of their inquiry or, at most, are
merely noted in passing. 174 Moreover, this lack of any meaningful engagement
with antitrust issues within this speech context is not a function of the
commentator's position regarding the availability of First Amendment
protection. Those commentators who essentially argue that no speech
protection extends to Google's search engine do not themselves meaningfully
engage the significant questions associated with the anticompetitive use of
information products as commercial expression. 75
b. A View from the Supreme Court
In the absence of controlling or sufficiently instructive precedent regarding
First Amendment defenses to antitrust matters involving information providers,
widely divergent positions emerged. The foregoing two viewpoints disagreed
regarding the character of the speech at issue and, consequently, the extent of
First Amendment protection. If either interpretation were adopted, the antitrust
laws would obviously receive their traditional applications. The Supreme
170 Id. at 1472.
171 ld at 1446.
172 Id. at 1479.
173 Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REv. 1495, 1496 (2013).
174 See, e.g., James Grimmelman, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REv. 868 (2014).
Grimmelman examines "what a search engine is" and concludes that one's assessment of
search engine bias depends upon whether search engine operators are viewed primarily as
conduits, editors, or, as he proposes, advisers. Id. at 871, 873. His discussion of the FTC's
inquiry into search engine bias does not substantively engage antitrust law, though he notes
in conclusion that his advisor theory can "provide insights into antitrust case against
Google." Id. at 950.
175 See, e.g., Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access,
Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1149, 1199 (2008)
(arguing that the likely absence of First Amendment protections extending to search engines
"does not mean that any attempt to regulate search engines will be categorically immune
from First Amendment review").
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Court's sole foray into this realm addressed whether restrictions on the "sale,
disclosure, and use" of an information product constitutes speech worthy of
First Amendment protection. 176 At a minimum, this ruling underscores the
serious need to address First Amendment-based defenses to antitrust actions
involving information products.
In IMS Health, the Supreme Court held that a Vermont law prohibiting the
use of prescriber-identifiable information by marketers violated the First
Amendment. 177 As described by the Court, medical doctors prescribe
pharmaceuticals to their patients and pharmacies fill those prescriptions. 178
Consequently, the pharmacies have become repositories for extensive
information regarding doctors' prescription practices. 179 Pharmacies frequently
sell that information to data aggregators or intermediaries, such as the named
plaintiff IMS Health.'80 IMS Health removes patient related information, as
HIPAA requires, and repackages or restructures the information.' 8' Ultimately,
pharmaceutical companies purchase and mine the data, a practice known as
detailing, to better understand the prescribing practices of individual doctors. 8 2
The marketing departments then use this information to enable their
companies' drug representatives to more effectively target physicians. 83
The Court held that the "sale, disclosure, and use" of this prescribing
information was speech.'8 4 Moreover, the Court determined that the Vermont
statute evinced speaker- and content-based discrimination. 8 5 The majority
focused repeatedly, during both oral argument and in its opinion, upon the fact
that the legislation was expressly enacted to influence the marketplace for
ideas.'8 6 The directed marketing, facilitated by detailing practices, was
176 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011).
177 Id
178 Id.
119 Id. ("Pharmacies as a matter of business routine and federal law, receive prescriber-
identifying information when processing prescriptions.").
180 Id. ("Many pharmacies sell [prescriber-identifying information] to . . . firms that
analyze [it] and produce reports on prescriber-behavior.").
181 IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir, 2008), abrogated by JMS Health,
131 S. Ct. 2653 ("To protect patient privacy, prescribees' names are encrypted, effectively
eliminating the ability to match particular prescriptions with particular patients.").
182 See IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2659-60.
183 Id.
184 See id. at 2663.
185 See id.
186 See id. at 2661; Transcript of Oral Argument at 14-16, IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. 2653.
The Supreme Court entertained considerable debate regarding the legislation's purpose,
effect, and motivation. Id. at 7-15. The majority questioned the candor of Vermont
regarding the privacy-based purpose alleged, to wit, protecting the prescribing physicians'
privacy. See IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2661-67. With regard to privacy protection, the
notion was that the pharmacies needed to acquire this information owing to the requirements
under the law, but that the doctors themselves retained an individual interest in this
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"effective speech" in that it influenced prescribing patterns and increased
costs. 187 The legislature sought to combat those cost increases by weakening
the associated speech.'8 8 The Court held that the legislative response to speech
with which it disagreed should be to promote greater social discussion rather
than to legally disadvantage such speech. 8 9
Two aspects of IMS Health are particularly relevant for instant purposes.
First, the case examined the fundamental question of whether or not a speech
interest adhered in the "sale, disclosure, and use" of information. 190 Precedent
regarding commercial speech addressed advertising restrictions rather than
constraints on information as a product itself, specifically a product whose
conveyance to a buyer or user constitutes the core market activity of
information provision firms.' 9' Nonetheless, the Court was unanimous in its
finding that the First Amendment protected speech in the "sale, disclosure, and
use" of information. 92 Second, notwithstanding the foregoing point of
agreement, the majority and dissent diverged widely regarding not only how
intermediate scrutiny applies to commercial speech, but also the parameters
and, indeed, the fate, of the intermediate standard more broadly. 93
Unfortunately, IMS Health provides scant guidance regarding how to apply an
"intermediate" scrutiny test within antitrust settings, both because the legal
setting is quite different and because the Justices diverged widely in their
views regarding the implementation of an intermediate standard.
First Amendment jurisprudence necessarily examines the constitutionality of
government restrictions on speech and necessarily results in polar outcomes-
information as well. Id. at 2669. The majority found the privacy argument to be pretextual
and concluded that if the goal had truly been privacy protection for the physicians then the
state would have enacted legislation that more meaningfully protected those interests. Id.
187 IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2671 (considering the State's argument that
"'pharmaceutical marketing has a strong influence on doctors' prescribing practices"').
188 Id. at 2670 ("The State seeks to achieve its [cost-related] policy objectives through the
indirect means of restraining certain speech by certain speakers .... ").
189 Id. at 2671 (.'[I]nformation is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their
own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end
is to open the channels of communication rather than to close them."' (quoting Va. State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976))).
19o See id. at 2663.
191 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996) (advertising
prohibitions regarding the "retail price of alcoholic beverages"); see also Cent. Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 558 (1980) (ban regarding
"promotional advertising by an electrical utility"); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at
752 (effectively forbidding the advertising of prescription drug prices).
19' IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2663.
193 Compare id. at 2667 ("[The law at issue] imposes a speaker- and content-based
burden on protected expression, and that circumstance is sufficient to justify application of
heightened scrutiny."), with id. at 2673 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The First Amendment does
not require courts to apply a special 'heightened' standard of review .... ").
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constitutional or unconstitutional. Intermediate scrutiny, as applied to
commercial speech, adjusts the constitutional standard based on a weighing of
various pertinent considerations. Defamation, in contrast, provides a
"conditional privilege" whose successful assertion modifies the legal showing
required of the plaintiff. In the circumstances this Article addresses, speech,
regardless of variety, is not the only issue; competition policy concerns must
also be assessed and respected. This difference opens up the possibility of a
middle ground treatment of speech, which feeds into the antitrust analysis itself
and will be one of the centerpieces of the recommendation made in Part III.
B. Innovation-Based Considerations
Polar outcomes characterize the antitrust and First Amendment interface.
This reflects, among other attributes, the practical difficulty in incorporating
noneconomic considerations such as speech into competition policy's
prevailing economic efficiency-based framework. This Section analyzes how
polar outcomes may also arise despite antitrust's fundamental interest in
incorporating innovation-based considerations into the legal analysis. Although
the speech and innovation matters at issue differ substantially, both give rise to
polar outcomes because the logic of antitrust's legal approaches to those two
considerations is similar.
As Part I illustrated, antitrust actions entailing design modifications to
information products may generate novel speech-based defenses as well as
defenses that assert a legitimate business purpose, i.e., that the redesign in
question incorporates improvements and/or innovations that benefit consumers
and, therefore, is procompetitive. Given the close connection between the
redesigns at issue and innovation, this Article focuses on innovation rather than
the full range of potential legitimate business justifications.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act addresses unilateral anticompetitive
conduct. 194 Such conduct is evaluated under the rule of reason standard that
condemns "unreasonable" restraints of trade. Though first articulated in the
seminal 1911 decision in Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States,195 courts
face a considerable challenge in the analysis of allegedly predatory design, as
with all rule of reason matters, in developing workable standards for
determining what constitutes unreasonable restraints of trade. United States v.
Grinnell Corp. 196 provides the seminal articulation of unlawful monopolization
under section 2, "the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident."' 97 The generality and
flexibility associated with the underlying legislation and the key legal
precedents constitutes both a strength and weakness of antitrust law.
194 See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
195 See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911).
196 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
197 Id. at 570-71.
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This Section briefly delineates the key antitrust doctrines and case law
applicable to innovation matters. After introducing the governing antitrust law,
it explores the difficulties associated with the statute's application to allegedly
predatory innovation and how those challenges manifest themselves in the case
law. This discussion concludes by briefly addressing the law surrounding
"monopoly broth," which, in the information provision context, allows for the
possibility that product redesign which generally does not independently
constitute an antitrust violation might do so in conjunction with
anticompetitive conduct apart from redesign.
1. Predatory Redesign
The application of section 2 case law to information products is complicated
both by the speech-based nature of information products and by the fact that
any product changes arguably involve innovation, which is broadly defined
here to include improvements that do not necessarily embody technological
advances. This Section reviews the law regarding section 2 conduct involving
product innovations that have both anticompetitive effects and procompetitive
benefits. Because none of the key cases in this jurisprudence involves speech,
the law has developed independently from the additional speech considerations
frequently raised within information product contexts.
Changes to products themselves are among the most common allegations of
unlawful, predatory product redesign. 198 One common allegation is that the
redesign creates intentional, and potentially unnecessary, incompatibilities with
rival products.1 99 Unfortunately, the courts have failed to carry over important
nuances from the articulation of the legal theory of the anticompetitive product
design to that theory's practical application. This lack of nuance has arguably
led to the uncritical overprotection of such anticompetitive product redesigns
under the mantle of fostering innovation and avoiding the substitution of the
court's judgment for that of the businesses themselves. This Article will argue
subsequently that the incorporation of further nuance is not precluded by
practical considerations.
Some of the most thoughtful guidance for assessing predatory design resides
in high-tech judicial rulings from years ago, sometimes decades ago, involving
198 Predatory design constitutes product change that may, or may not, incorporate
innovation. A product change might not involve innovation when, for example, both the
components and systems of the product have been employed previously. Other categories of
anticompetitive conduct include: refusals to deal, predatory pricing, and tying.
199 See, e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys. Inc., 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding
new design of biopsy needle gun made competitor replacement needles incompatible);
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding that
monopolist does not need to pre-notify competitors of changes to new format film); Abbott
Labs. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408 (D. Del. 2006) (arguing that
monopolist reformulated drug and withdrew previous versions of drug to impede generic
drug entry).
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industry giants such as Microsoft and IBM. 200 Consider, for example, the
predatory design found in United States v. Microsoft Corp.,201 in which the
plaintiffs alleged that Microsoft's monopoly operating system was designed to
integrate its own Internet browser in ways that disadvantaged browser rivals.20 2
The D.C. Circuit's ruling acknowledged that, "as a general rule, courts are properly
very skeptical about claims that competition has been harmed by a dominant firm's
product design change." 20 3 But the court held that "[j]udicial deference to product
innovation, however, does not mean that a monopolist's product design decisions
are per se lawful. '20 4 The court's guiding legal principles were clear, as it
required the establishment of anticompetitive harms and procompetitive
benefits, and then balancing them to determine overall competitive effects.20 5
Anticompetitive harms include increases in price (adjusting for quality
changes) or reductions in quality, variety, or innovation, while procompetitive
benefits include lower prices or increases in quality, variety, or innovation. 20 6
The plaintiff bears the burden to establish the requisite harm.20 7 As such, the
plaintiff must allege that a monopolist has undertaken exclusionary conduct
with anticompetitive effect. If a prima facie case is established, then the
monopolist can aver a procompetitive benefit for its conduct. The plaintiff can
then attempt to rebut by demonstrating that the justification is pretextual. 20 8
Finally, if both bona fide pro- and anticompetitive effects are demonstrated,
balancing is required. "[T]he plaintiff must demonstrate that the
anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs the procompetitive benefit. 20 9
a. Anticompetitive Effect
The first step in the predatory design analysis delineated in Microsoft is
whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie showing of anticompetitive
conduct, though much earlier cases, including In re IBM Peripheral EDP
Devices Antitrust Litigation,210 offer valuable exposition on this issue:
200 E.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Transamerica
Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983); Cal. Computer Prods. v. IBM
Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.
1975).
201 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
202 Id. at 60.
203 Id. at 65.
204 Id. (citations omitted).
205 Id. at 58-59.
206 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
2 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/82TN-HHHT.
207 See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58.
208 Id. at 59.
209 Id. (emphasis added).
210 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Transamerica Computer Co. v.
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If the design choice is unreasonably restrictive of competition, the
monopolist's conduct violates the Sherman Act. This standard will allow
the factfinder to consider the effects of the design on competitors; the
effects of the design on consumers; the degree to which the design was
the product of desirable technological creativity; and the monopolist's
intent, since a contemporaneous evaluation by the actor should be helpful
to the factfinder in determining the effects of a technological change.2 11
Identifying and then proving anticompetitive conduct can be challenging.
Neither the acquisition of monopoly power nor the maintenance or expansion
of monopoly power are, without more, unlawfully anticompetitive.21 2 In
contrast to per se illegal price-fixing activity, for example, the conduct at issue
in section 2 cases is facially unobjectionable. Monopolists or would-be
monopolists, like other market participants, must decide what products they
will sell, determine those products' key features, set prices, establish terms
regarding whether or how to deal with other market participants, and
frequently seek to innovate in their product designs, manufacturing processes,
and sales policies. This underlying reality has heavily informed the evolution
of the law regarding anticompetitive innovation or product design, and is
reflected in a very strong concern with obtaining false positives in enforcement
activity as well as chilling the legitimate, often beneficial, business of market
participants more generally.
b. Procompetitive Effect
Procompetitive benefits, i.e., benefits to consumers, are generally addressed
in terms of whether one or more legitimate business justifications underlies the
conduct in question.213 The legal consequences of such justifications have been
subject to varying judicial interpretations. Certain points of broad consensus
exist, however; for example, cases and commentators generally agree that
merely increasing profits does not suffice to constitute a legitimate business
justification. The reason is straightforward: some of the most blatantly illegal
anticompetitive conduct will redound to the economic benefit of those
undertaking the actions. Instead, a legitimate business justification must also
reflect some consumer welfare benefit.214 If the defendant asserts such a
IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983).
211 Id. at 1003 (emphasis added).
212 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
213 Determining whether a challenged practice has "a legitimate business justification" is
a "key factor" in assessing whether a dominant firm's unilateral conduct was
"unreasonable" and, thereby, violated the antitrust laws. An FTC Guide to the Antitrust
Laws, http://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-
firm-conduct, archived at http://perma.cc/TGL4-H49H. See supra notes 195197 and
accompanying text (discussing antitrust proscription of "unreasonable" restraints of trade).
214 It should also be noted that there is some question about the uncertainty associated
with innovation. For example, defendants may introduce a product change fully anticipating
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benefit or justification, the plaintiff may then try to rebut the justification
proffered as pretextual.
The most common legitimate business justification for a product redesign is
that the change incorporates improvements or innovations that will benefit at
least some customers.21 5 The difficulties associated with determining the
significance of a purported innovation are manifest. Probably for this reason,
most prevailing legal analysis probes whether the claimed innovation is
pretextual rather than attempting a more searching assessment of the degree of
innovation. Under this approach, if the justification for the claimed innovation
is deemed pretextual, balancing is unnecessary. Even with such an all-or-
nothing approach, this Article argues, unacknowledged, and oftentimes
dispositive, balancing may be occurring. Depending upon how broadly or
narrowly "legitimate business justification" and "pretext" are defined, the court
may avoid the ultimate balancing contemplated in the final stage of the rule of
reason analysis. 216
c. Balancing
Given a contested design change for which both pro and anticompetitive
effects are alleged, some courts would require balancing of those effects. That
approach is forcefully articulated in Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. :217
Particularly offensive to the Court is the [defendant's] assertion
that... [its] conduct violates §2 of the Sherman Act only if the "design
changes had no purpose and effect other than the preclusion
of. . .competition." This is simply not true .... The standard
actually... contemplates the effect the design choice has on competition.
It does not impose the much heavier burden on a plaintiff of
that the change will constitute an improvement that consumers value, when in fact it does
not. Or, only some customers may view the change as an improvement, when the company
thought that most would value it. Both of these situations are distinguishable from one in
which no consumer benefit was contemplated or could have been contemplated. This of
course leads to the associated question of intent that is often a critical issue in an attempted
monopolization case, or in determining whether or not there is a bona fide legitimate
business justification for the design change. Intent can be helpful, but is insufficient, in
assessing in a competitive effect.
215 See, e.g., In re Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litig., 796 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1144 (N.D.
Cal. 2011) ("Plaintiffs' expert presents testimony that iTunes 4.7 'introduced a radically
different' encryption technology which was 'much more resistant to attack' than previous
versions of the software.").
216 "A more generalized standard, one applicable to all types of otherwise legal conduct
by a monopolist ... must be applied to the technological design activity here." Caldera, Inc.
v. Microsoft Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1313 (D. Utah 1999) (quoting IBM Peripheral
EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. at 1003).
217 Id.
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demonstrating that a design choice is entirely devoid of technological
merit.218
Nearly a decade later, another court not only restated the same legal
principle, but also similarly chided the defendant's antitrust counsel for its
flawed characterization of the law. 219
Contrary to Defendant's assertion, Plaintiffs are not required to prove that
the new formulations were absolutely no better than the prior version or
that the only purpose of the innovation was to eliminate the
complementary product of a rival.... [I]f Plaintiffs show anticompetitive
harm from the formulation changes, that harm will be weighed against
any benefits presented by Defendants. 220
But other courts have rejected the balancing of pro- and anticompetitive
effects as unworkable. They hold that unless an innovation-based justification
for the alleged anticompetitive innovation is entirely pretextual, no antitrust
liability should adhere. 22 1 In Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health
Care Group LP,222 the Ninth Circuit held that such balancing is both "unwise"
and "unadministrable. 223
There are no criteria that courts can use to calculate the "right" amount of
innovation, which would maximize social gains and minimize
competitive injury.... Absent some form of coercive conduct by the
monopolist, the ultimate worth of a genuine product improvement can be
adequately judged only by the market itself.224
218 Id. at 1312-13 (citations omitted).
219 See Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408 (D. Del. 2006).
220 Id. at 422 (citations omitted).
221 An earlier line of cases suggests the use of a less restrictive alternative approach to
avoid the need to balance pro- and anticompetitive effects. This approach would essentially
negate an innovation's claimed value if that value could have been achieved with a
reasonable alternative design that had a less anticompetitive effect. "[I]n scrutinizing design
conduct, [section] 2 would merely require the monopolist's design to be 'reasonable', rather
than to be the design alternative least restrictive of competition. Thus, the 'reasonableness'
of the design of a monopolist's new products (vis-a-vis competitors' products which were
technically linked to or dependent upon the monopolist's product) may be scrutinized under
[section] 2 in cases in which 'market forces cannot operate' that is, in cases in which a
single firm controls the entire market or in which a monopolist engages in coercive conduct
to affect consumer choice." GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203, 1228
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
222 592 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2010).
223 Id. at 1000.
224 Id. Similarly, in Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litigation, the district court dismissed
the antitrust claim concerning Apple's adoption of iTunes 4.7 for its iPod because the
plaintiff's expert acknowledged some procompetitive effect. More specifically, "[b]ecause
iTunes 4.7 was a genuine improvement, the [c]ourt may not balance the benefits or worth of
iTunes 4.7 against its anticompetitive effects." In re Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litig., 796
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Notwithstanding the foregoing examples wherein courts strongly guarded
their prerogative to engage in balancing, no court has done so (or
acknowledged doing so) to any meaningful extent.225 This disagreement
regarding the appropriate analysis of alleged predatory design has been largely
sidestepped in practice.
In nearly all cases, the judges have deemed balancing to be unnecessary
because they found the evidence to be unambiguously one-sided. This extreme
evidentiary imbalance reflects that either the claimed innovation is found to be
pretextual, or the plaintiffs do not argue against the existence or size,
magnitude, or benefit of the claimed innovation. The D.C. Circuit's ruling in
Microsoft illustrates the latter situation. The court held that although Microsoft
made general claims about the value of integrating the browser and the
operating system, it "neither specifies nor substantiates those claims. '226
Microsoft argued that it had "valid technical reasons" for this integration and
F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1144 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Allied Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., 592
F.3d at 1000). Several high-profile efforts to formally truncate the rule of reason have been
unsuccessful. For example, the courts have properly rejected the argument that the fact that
one has been able to patent the allegedly predatory innovation effectively renders that
product design itself immune to antitrust liability. See, e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc.,
157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
225 James D. Hurwitz and William E. Kovacic describe similar tensions and tradeoffs
characterizing predatory design cases decided in the late 1970s and very early 1980s.
Judicial Analysis of Predation: The Emerging Trends, 35 VAND. L. REv. 63 (1982)
(hereinafter Emerging Trends]. They specifically reference the following sequence of
judicial rulings albeit in a more comprehensive manner. Id. at 113-23. In 1978, Judge Conti,
in ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp, held that "when the approach chosen was at
least as justifiable as the alternative, ...courts should not get involved in the second
guessing of engineers." 458 F. Supp. 423, 440-411 (N.D. Cal 1978), aff'dper curiam sub
nom., Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 452 U.S.
972 (1981). A year later, in 1979, Judge Schnacke, in Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM
Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied
464 U.S. 955 (1983) rejected Conti's approach as "overprotective" because it suggested
that, "where there is a valid engineering dispute over a product's superiority the inquiry
should end." Id. at 1003. Hurwitz and Kovacic conclude that while Schnacke's "test
potentially is more flexible and less deferential" regarding innovation-based defenses, as a
practical matter "the court's ultimate holding was that a product change must lack virtually
any redeeming qualities to result in antitrust liability." Emerging Trends, supra, at 120
(citations omitted). For a thoughtful and more current analysis that highlights the ongoing
challenges posed by such matters and condemns the judicial treatment, in all its varied
forms, as "unsatisfactory," see generally Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Anticompetitive
Innovation and the Quality of Invention, 27 BERKELEY TECH. Li. 1, 10-21 (2012) ("In the
past fifteen years, three circuit courts of appeals have announced three very different
standards for analyzing claims of predatory innovation. All three are unsatisfactory, though
for different reasons.").
226 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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for overriding the user's choice of a default browser. 227 The plaintiffs appeared
to have neither rebutted the proffered justification nor demonstrated that the
anticompetitive effect outweighed the proffered procompetitive justifications.
In particular, during the appeal itself, the "plaintiffs offer[ed] no rebuttal
whatsoever. Accordingly, Microsoft may not be held liable for this aspect of its
product design. '2 28
Taken at face value, the absence of cases undertaking explicit balancing229
could be explained by a distribution of pro- and anticompetitive effects in
section 2 predatory design cases, which rarely includes small or modest
innovation in the face of a demonstrable anticompetitive effect. This
explanation strains credulity, however. More likely, either the courts that
espouse balancing so heavily weigh innovation that they effectively follow the
Ninth Circuit approach in Allied Orthopedic, or they expand the category of
pretext to include small innovations as well as non-innovations.
This expansion-of-category explanation suggests that courts may eschew the
difficult task of balancing procompetitive and anticompetitive effects and,
instead, opt to determine whether the claim of a legitimate business purpose
was, or was not, pretextual. When courts discount or reject defendants'
"general" or "abstract" justifications of redesigns, they may be implicitly
stating that the procompetitive effects are substantially weaker than the
anticompetitive effects. Conversely, when innovation is "found," it almost
invariably suffices to overcome whatever anticompetitive effect may be
present. This interpretation suggests that courts may be somewhat
disingenuous in explaining their determinations. It is broadly consistent,
however, with the espoused principle supporting balancing, and it is made
easier as more and more rulings seemingly take this indirect approach.
The Ninth Circuit approach to predatory design is arguably extreme in that
the court elevates innovation and business judgment values over
anticompetitive effects. While the wisdom of this position is clearly debatable,
it is unambiguous and transparent. A more subtle problem emerges in the use
of the alternative "balancing" approach in practice. There is no problem, of
course, where the actual facts fully preclude any balancing. But if balancing
occurs under the guise of determinations regarding pretextual claims of
innovation, the evolution of predatory design law would likely be biased
against the use of balancing in the future. Proponents of the innovation-trumps-
all-anticompetitive-effects position gain additional support from the ostensible
227 Id. at 67.
228 Id.
229 Despite having espoused such balancing in theory, these courts do not appear to have
done so in practice. See Allied Orthopedic Appliances, Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp., 592
F.3d at 1000 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("Although one
federal court of appeals has nominally included a balancing component in its test, it has not
yet attempted to apply it.").
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outcomes of such cases, while discourse regarding how to make nuanced
assessments of the various effects and how to balance them remains stunted.
In summary, most observers believe that courts have responded quite
favorably to legitimate business purpose defenses involving innovation as long
as they are non-pretextual. This appears to reflect a general skepticism towards
allegedly anticompetitive design and an apparent unwillingness to second-
guess business decisions, especially those associated with innovation. While
some courts maintain that balancing is necessary, in practice these same courts
typically find either the existence of a plausible procompetitive rationale for
the product change or that the proffered rationale was pretextual. Either way,
current precedent has effectively resulted in a polar outcome regarding the
innovation and antitrust interface: the existence of a nonpretextual innovation
justification is sufficient to overcome claimed anticompetitive effects.
2. Monopoly Broth
The antitrust analysis, thus far, has examined anticompetitive redesign as an
independent section 2 cause of action. As a practical matter, however,
plaintiffs alleging predatory design also typically allege other anticompetitive
conduct. Given the challenges associated with a predatory redesign-based
cause of action and the fact that it is often alleged as part of more complex
misconduct, the "monopoly broth" doctrine may uniquely contribute in such
contexts. Monopoly broth provides a mechanism by which different acts of
alleged misconduct that do not individually constitute an antitrust violation,
nevertheless, may be key elements in an overall course of conduct that does
constitute an antitrust violation.230
More than fifty years ago, the Supreme Court articulated the key dynamic
underlying what would become the monopoly broth doctrine. The Court
instructed that "plaintiffs should be given the full benefit of their proof without
tightly compartmentalizing the various factual components and wiping the
slate clean after scrutiny of each. '231 In practice, this meant that the allegedly
anticompetitive conduct is "not to be judged by dismembering it and viewing
its separate parts, but only by looking at it as a whole. 2 32 Monopoly broth case
law reflects concerns about the under-inclusiveness of section 2 given varied
factual allegations while remaining cognizant about avoiding
overcompensation in the other direction. This tempered approach is reflected in
the admonition "to look at conduct in the aggregate because '[i]t is the mix of
the various ingredients of utility behavior in a monopoly broth that produces
230 See, e.g., City of Mishawaka v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976, 986 (7th Cir.
1980) ("It is the mix of the various ingredients.., in a monopoly broth that produces the
unsavory flavor."); Tele Atlas N.V. v. NAVTEQ Corp., No. C-05-01673 RS, 2008 WL
4911230, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2008) ("To appreciate the effect of otherwise lawful
acts, the jury must consider the acts' aggregate effect.").
231 Cont'l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699 (1962).
232 Id.
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the unsavory flavor.' . . . [However, c]ourts and juries must be careful in
'tasting' the broth because the consequence is to throw out perfectly good
soup. 2 3 3
While the monopoly broth theory has been successfully invoked only
infrequently, it remains good law. For example, the court in Free Freehand
Corp. v. Adobe Sys. Inc. 234 opined:
[T]his Court need not decide whether a plaintiff can survive a motion to
dismiss by alleging a series of procompetitive acts that, in the aggregate,
combine to violate the antitrust laws. The allegations of anticompetitive
acts, and their aileged aggregated anticompetitive effect, fall squarely
within the bounds of established monopoly broth theory.235
Consideration of the monopoly broth theory is most appealing, of course,
when various challenged activities, viewed separately and individually, are
insufficient to find antitrust liability. However, a polar approach to liability,
such as in determinations regarding redesign, undermines the aggregate
approach that is essential to monopoly broth theory. 236 That is, perhaps one
unintended consequence of the arguably polar approach to predatory design is
that it effectively removes predatory design as an ingredient from a monopoly
broth argument.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS
Part II revealed an unfortunate parallel between the treatments of innovation
and speech within antitrust contexts. Antitrust rulings suffer from the
reluctance to meaningfully acknowledge that legitimate innovation or speech
interests might warrant some legal solicitude short of de facto immunization.
Part II also identified important precedent that, this Article argues, militates
against such polar treatment. Transcending that polar treatment is increasingly
important in antitrust matters concerning information products often
characterized by uncertain innovations and modest speech interests. Towards
that end, Part III proposes two analytical frameworks that establish a legal
middle ground for the treatment of both innovation and speech interests within
antitrust. 237 It then applies those frameworks to examples of antitrust
challenges that focus on product redesigns by Google and Nielsen.
233 Tele Atlas N. V., 2008 WL 4911230, at *2 n.l (citations omitted).
234 852 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
235 Id. at 1184.
236 See generally Daniel A. Crane, Does Monopoly Broth Make Bad Soup?, 76
ANTITRUST L.J. 663 (2010). The use of monopoly broth theory in practice is significantly
affected by the placement and magnitude of the burden of proof/persuasion. The fact that a
cause of action may be made more or less difficult to allege or, if successfully alleged, more
or less difficult to rebut, is part and parcel of varying underlying tensions.
237 Recall that this Article defines innovation broadly to include product improvements
that do not necessarily embody technological change.
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A. Recommendations
The recommended frameworks propose, as a baseline matter, a more
nuanced treatment of innovation and speech-based defenses to antitrust
actions. In the context of innovation, the recommendation replaces a polar
approach with one that is quite literally more balanced, as it weighs the
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of the conduct at issue. Similarly,
this Article rejects a polar approach to the intersection of the First Amendment
and antitrust. Such a polar approach is exemplified by some antitrust
defendants' increasingly vigorous advocacy that their commerce-related
speech is immunized from antitrust liability. Though the judiciary has not yet
squarely addressed this issue, it is notable that the judiciary may have become
increasingly sympathetic to expanding strong First Amendment protection to
commerce-related speech within other contexts. At a minimum, the
recommendations contained in the proposed framework do not permit
commerce-related speech to immunize otherwise unlawful product redesigns
from antitrust law.
The recommendations regarding antitrust's interface with speech and
innovation-based defenses receive separate treatment initially within this Part.
The implications of the commingling of speech and innovation in information
product redesign for those recommendations are then discussed. In particular,
this Article considers how the current polar treatment of innovation, which
arguably immunizes conduct involving nonpretextual innovation from antitrust
liability, ultimately impacts protection accorded to speech. The extreme nature
of the protection given innovation means that if speech and nonpretextual
innovation coexist in a product redesign, then the speech is protected as well,
albeit inadvertently. However, if the antitrust case law reduced the protections
accorded nonpretextual innovation, e.g., if the procompetitive effects of small
innovations are balanced against anticompetitive effects, then the spillover
protection of speech is diminished. And, in those instances wherein innovation
does not accompany speech, forthright protection of speech values is
necessary. Thus, even given the current legal treatment of innovation defenses
in antitrust actions, the treatment of speech and innovation in information
product antitrust actions warrants reconsideration that specifically accounts for
the spillover or lack of spillover protection one regime provides to the other.
1. Treatment of Innovation
How should antitrust assess allegedly anticompetitive changes to
information products in which there is no speech interest? This Article
recommends that courts actually undertake the admittedly difficult task of
balancing pro- and anticompetitive effects. Benefits to consumers resulting
from a product redesign in the form of lower prices or increased quality or
variety of offerings are procompetitive effects. Increases in innovation that
might, for example, result from redesigns that encourage additional
development of complementary products, are also procompetitive, though the
effect is indirect. Conversely, increases in prices and decreases in quality,
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variety, or innovation harm consumers and are anticompetitive effects. 238
Although balancing pro- and anticompetitive effects is central to most antitrust
analyses, courts are divided regarding whether and how to assess product
changes involving nonpretextual innovation. As discussed, courts that reject
balancing typically deem it unworkable, while those endorsing balancing,
through their own inaction, have failed to demonstrate its workability. 239 This
issue is clearly an instance illustrating the proverbial "devil in the details."
With regard to innovation, this recommendation identifies discrete
competitive effects amenable to at least first-order balancing. It also
demonstrates the potential antitrust significance of even such limited
information and identifies pathways for its expansion including some proposed
tests that sometimes reduce the complexity involved in balancing. Finally, it
underscores the folly associated with ignoring important, but complex, realities
in favor of unrealistic shortcuts. To the extent that a business justification,
unrelated to innovation, also receives polar outcome treatment, the general
approach recommended for innovation would also apply.
More specifically, because this recommendation would require courts to
identify and assess the relative size of the pro- and anticompetitive effects, this
Section first illustrates how these effects can be estimated. The problem of
balancing is considered with additional discussion regarding questions about
the antitrust standard and its implications for chilling innovation. The viability
of balancing competitive effects depends on, first, whether absolute and
relative measures of their magnitude can reasonably be estimated and, second,
the extent to which differing competitive effects can be compared. To facilitate
the latter comparison, particularly when estimates regarding the magnitude of
the innovation at issue are quite uncertain, a presumption favoring innovation
over price effects is adopted.
Anticompetitive Effects. Identifying and assessing anticompetitive effects
pervades antitrust analysis generally. 240 Normally, this analysis entails
considering direct evidence of the effects through comparisons of price,
quality, or variety changes before and after the product redesign. Because of
the complexities associated with product redesigns, however, such market-
level changes are alone unlikely to be determinative, though they may still
reveal evidence of anticompetitive effects. 241 A redesign's consequences for a
238 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 206, at 2.
239 See supra Part II.B.l.c.
240 Jonathan Jacobson, Scott Sher & Edward Holman, Predatory Innovation: An Analysis
of Allied Orthopedic v. Tyco in the Context of Section 2 Jurisprudence, 23 Loy. CONSUMER
L. REV. 1, 33 (2010) (balancing the effects of alleged antitrust conduct in predatory
innovation cases involves "fundamentally the same test that the courts and agencies apply
almost every day in determining whether a merger violates Section 7 of the Clayton Act").
241 In theory, one could avoid weighing pro- and anticompetitive effects, for example,
through simple before-and-after price comparisons to determine the net effect of allegedly
offending conduct on consumer welfare. Such price comparisons require adjusting the prices
for quality. This is particularly difficult in product design contexts wherein the qualitative
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rival's ability to compete would also be relevant. Anticompetitive redesigns
that involved ostensibly intentional incompatibilities or redesigns that
increased the customer switching costs would constitute evidence of a
defendant's attempt to raise a rival's costs or to deter entry; both of those
circumstances are linked to decreases in competition and increases in market
price.2 42 If evidence of anticompetitive intent exists, then it may also inform
estimates of competitive effects by indicating the expected qualitative effect of
the redesign.
Procompetitive Effects. The most relevant procompetitive effect for product
redesigns is the benefit consumers receive from increased quality. Assessment
of the increased quality of the redesign, i.e., the magnitude of the innovation, is
therefore key.2 43 A logical starting point for assessing an innovation's
value of a given innovation may engender significant debate. Further complicating such
assessments is the fact that the products as redesigned and as earlier designed may target
somewhat different markets.
242 Mark S. Popofsky, Charting Antitrust's New Frontier: B2B, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV.
565 (2001), provides a hypothetical example of a potentially anticompetitive redesign in the
business-to-business ("B2B") context. He posits a dominant B2B marketplace that
introduces an "innovative technology" that changes the marketplace from an open to a
closed procurement system. This change increases the switching costs of those using the
marketplace and, in turn, raises rivals' costs. Id. at 582-84. See also Steven C. Salop,
Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73
ANTITRUST L.J. 311 (2006) for a discussion of calculating and comparing pro- and
anticompetitive effects in the context of an incompatible product design change and where
the exclusionary actions involve the maintenance of the monopoly.
243 The time and resources firms devote to new product development ("NPD") are
enormous and are reflected in an extensive business literature. NPD concepts apply, in
differing ways, to the full range of new products: "new-to-the world products," "new-to-the
company products," market extensions, line extensions, product improvements, and cost
improvements. THE PDMA HANDBOOK OF NEW PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT 374 (Kenneth A.
Kahn et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005). While the presence or absence of a "formal process for
conducting new product development" previously served as "a differentiator between the
best performers and other companies, companies now view having a process as a necessary
aspect of product development." Id. at 549.
At the risk of vastly oversimplifying the process, several factors warrant particular
emphasis. First, typically there are numerous developmental stages each followed by a
review process in which the gatekeepers determine whether the project will proceed or be
terminated. Critical review periods include initial screen, business case evaluation, and
launch. Id. at 337-38. Ultimately, whether a new product "launch can reasonably be
justified" requires a multifaceted "final business evaluation" whose dimensions include
market share, market attractiveness, product evaluation, cost forecast, and sales forecast.
EDWIN E. BROBROW, THE COMPLETE IDIOT'S GUIDE TO NEW PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT 181
(1997). Forecasts "are normally in dollars" and constitute an "elemental part" of "most, if
not all, go/no-go decisions" within NPD. PMDA HANDBOOK, supra at 362. A survey of
companies post-launch regarding the accuracy of their new product forecasts revealed that
cost improvements (72%) and product improvement forecasts (65%) were the most
accurately forecasted categories, and new-to-the-world (40%) and new-to-the-company
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magnitude is to estimate the value a consumer receives from the change.244
Estimating such procompetitive effects involves standard marketing techniques
that firms typically undertake as part of their product development and
launch. 245 More specifically, the actual price that consumers were willing to
pay and the sales response more generally provide information that facilitates
an ex post estimate of consumer valuation of the innovation. While the most
appropriate metric would be a firm's expected response rather than the
response it actually received, the latter information is still useful.246 The greater
challenge involves products that represent significant breaks from previous
offerings. However, incremental redesign is relatively common in information
product settings, and it constitutes the easiest setting to analyze because
previous market experience provides a good basis for extrapolation. 247 Along
similar lines, another way to assess relative innovation is to compare the
innovation at issue to that which is commonplace with product redesigns in the
industry or by the firm itself.
(47%) were the least accurate forecasts. Id. at 374.
244 Given a specific redesign, it is also possible to directly compare the features between
the new product at issue and the product it replaced. One problem with this approach is that
redesigns typically involve a "mixed bag." Daniel A. Crane, Legal Rules for Predatory
Innovation, CONCURRENCES: COMPETITION L.J., no. 4, 2013, at 4, available at
http://www.concurrences.com/Joumal/Issues/No-4-2013/Doctrines-I 492/Legal-rules-for-
predatory?lang=fr, archived at http://perma.cc/8CJF-77C5.
245 See generally Elie Ofek & V. Srinivasan, How Much Does the Market Value an
Improvement in a Product Attribute?, 21 MARKETING Sci. 398, 399 (2002) (proposing and
applying an econometric method through which firms can estimate the "market's value for
an attribute improvement (MVAI)"). See also THE PDMA TOOLBOOK FOR NEW PRODUCT
DEVELOPMENT 89 (Paul Belliveau et al. eds., 2002) ("Customer-perceived value [("CPV")]
is the result of the customer's evaluation of all the benefits and all the costs of an offering as
compared to that customer's perceived alternatives."). It entails addressing three questions
whose answers are generally complex, relative, and dynamic: "I. How will the CPV
attributes be judged in the marketplace? 2. What alternatives to the potential offering exist?
3. How might competitors offering alternatives attempt to influence the customer's balance
scale?" Id. at 90, 101.
246 Richard Gilbert, Holding Innovation to an Antitrust Standard, 3 COMPETITION POL'Y
INT'L 47, 52 (2007) ("If the goal of antitrust enforcement is to promote socially desirable
conduct and deter undesirable conduct, then the conduct should be evaluated based on the
information that was available when it occurred.").
247 There are a number of other complicated considerations that are important in some,
but arguably not all, circumstances. For example, how is the innovation in question related
to other innovations and, if it is, how does one estimate the innovation's value? Gilbert
notes, for example, that many innovations build on one another, and he therefore cautions
that focusing too narrowly on a particular innovation does not account for the full value of
the innovation. Id.; see also Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants:
Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 31 (1991) (observing, in the
context of a discussion about allocating patent rights, that "[plart of the first innovation's
social value is the boost it gives to later innovators").
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In some cases a question arises as to the scope of the redesign at issue. More
specifically, is the redesign more appropriately analyzed as a bundle of
relatively unrelated innovations, or should it be analyzed as an integrated
whole? In Microsoft, the product redesigns appeared to reflect different
degrees of integration between their constituent parts.248 If one can establish
that the conduct at issue can be isolated to a portion of the redesign that is
functionally separable from other segments of the redesign, a court may
narrow its focus accordingly. In so doing, an innovation-based defense would
then require the defendant to demonstrate the existence and size of the
innovation associated with the component, rather than rely on innovation that
characterizes the redesign as a whole.
In extreme cases this redefinition may effectively eliminate an innovation-
based defense if no innovation is associated with the specific change at issue.
Essentially, this argument requires the court to compare the actual redesign to
viable "less restrictive" redesign altematives. This inquiry seems particularly
relevant to information products, which often consist of multiple changes,
some of which are integrated and some of which may be viewed as relatively
separable from the other changes (e.g., changes to the underlying software
code). Evidence suggesting that the defendant was both aware of potential
anticompetitive effects and considered design alternatives with very similar (or
even superior) innovative qualities but without the anticompetitive effect
would weigh against the defendant.249 This "less restrictive alternative" type of
screen, if sufficiently cabined in its application, could be a useful mechanism
to assess the relative size of the innovation at issue and has value, at a
minimum, as a tie-breaking factor.250
Balancing. Balancing the pro- and anticompetitive effects of design changes
presents additional challenges. Although innovation and anticompetitive
effects both are linked to consumer welfare, these effects will generally be, or
appear to be, relatively incommensurate. Such incommensurability complicates
balancing these competitive effects, as balancing requires at least some
reliance on what this Article terms a metaphorical "conversion factor." This
complication is not, however, fatal. Courts routinely make judgments
involving incommensurate factors. When courts rule that a given innovation
trumps any anticompetitive effect, they are making this difficult decision. The
benefit, then, in an approach that crucially depends on the presence or absence
248 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
249 See, e.g., Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997)
(finding that plaintiff can overcome a showing that the challenged conduct has a net
procompetitive effect by identifying an alternative means of achieving the same effect).
250 See Dennis A. Yao & Thomas N. Dahdouh, Information Problems in Merger
Decision Making and Their Impact on Development of an Efficiencies Defense, 62
ANTITRUST L.J. 23, 38-40 (1994) (discussing, in the context of merger analysis, the
informational problems associated with the use of less restrictive alternatives test); see also
Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051, 1067 & n.44
(1979) (discussing the use of political concerns as tie-breakers in merger analyses).
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of innovation, is its relative ease of implementation and not its avoidance of a
difficult tradeoff.
As discussed, current antitrust law regarding product redesign largely adopts
a conversion factor in which the presence of innovation trumps any
anticompetitive effect. For example, the Ninth Circuit explicitly eschews any
substantive balancing.251 The D.C. Circuit has embraced balancing in theory,
but it only finds antitrust liability when innovation is pretextual.2 52 Given the
implausibility that product redesign is almost never both pro- and
anticompetitive, two reasonable interpretations of such rulings seem most
plausible: either no balancing is occurring, or balancing occurs but it is
obscured by a finding that innovation is pretextual when, in fact, it is not. If
stealth balancing is occurring, such opacity is undesirable both as a matter of
legal process and because it undermines discourse that is critical to developing
the court's ability to make these difficult determinations.
The difficulties with assessing and then comparing the pro- and
anticompetitive effects of exclusionary conduct involving innovation have led
some scholars and practitioners to recommend tests that assess the challenged
conduct's net impact.253 Two of the most prominent tests are the "no economic
sense" and the "consumer welfare" tests. The "no economic sense" test, a
descendent of the "profit sacrifice" test, essentially asks whether the conduct at
issue would have been undertaken if there was no expectation of
anticompetitive effect.254 If the anticompetitive consequences were essential to
251 See Allied Orthopedic, 592 F.3d at 1000 ("There is no room in this analysis for
balancing the benefits or worth of a product improvement against its anticompetitive
effects.") and supra notes 226228 and accompanying text (discussing Allied Orthopedic).
252 See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59 (explaining that once a monopolist asserts "a
nonpretextual claim that its conduct is indeed a form of competition on the merits," the
burden then shifts to the plaintiff to "demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm of the
conduct outweighs the procompetitive benefit") and supra notes 200-213 and accompanying
text (discussing Microsoft).
253 But see Jacobson et al., supra note 240, at 3-4 (arguing that the Microsoft court's
balancing test is superior to the "profit sacrifice test" and the "no economic sense test" for
determining liability in predatory innovation cases).
254 A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclusionary
Conduct-Are There Unifying Principles?, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 391 (2006) (indicating
that "the test depends, not on the timeline, but rather on the nature of the conduct-on
whether it would make no business or economic sense but for its likelihood of harming
competition"); Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of
Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8, 9 (1981) ("Assuming that
businessmen know how their actions affect their profitability and the profitability of their
rivals, predatory objectives are present if a practice would be unprofitable without the exit it
causes, but profitable with the exit."); Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct
Under Section 2: The "No Economic Sense" Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 413, 414 (2006)
(explaining that the essential question is "whether challenged conduct would have been
expected to be profitable apart from any gains that conduct may produce through
eliminating competition").
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motivate the conduct at issue, it would be condemned. The "no economic
sense" test focuses on the firm and does not directly address the net benefit to
the consumer. In contrast, the "consumer welfare" test compares the change in
benefit to the consumer and the change in the price the consumer actually pays,
and condemns conduct in which the consumer is made worse off.255 These tests
constitute alternatives through which decisions regarding antitrust liability can
be evaluated, and each offers potentially useful input to the approach
recommended herein. 256 However, problems with both approaches concern the
estimation of consumer benefit, discussed previously, and the difficulties
associated with estimating unobservable effects.
iInvaton Sze
small unsure large
small no no no
unsure no no
4 large fyes 'no no
Workability and Chilling Innovation. The judgment that any level of
innovation should trump any anticompetitive effect reflects two debatable
premises. First, the courts always have great difficulty distinguishing between
very small innovations and larger innovations. Second, the overall effect on
innovation decreases when one moves towards balancing and away from
completely favoring innovation over any anticompetitive effect.
The first premise raises questions regarding the availability and reliability of
evidence underlying key decision inputs. Innovation, as defined herein,
includes product changes that may not embody technological advances, and
one should be careful not to think of innovation solely in terms of such
advances. Firms routinely redesign products and undertake marketing studies
predicting the effects of such redesigns. Some of these changes are substantial,
others are clearly incremental, and some may be so marginal that they would
not seem worthy of special treatment. Internal documents as well as expert
255 Salop, supra note 242, at 325 ("The consumer welfare effect test compares the
additional performance benefits to consumers ... to the additional price they must pay ....
It is obvious that rational consumers would have preferred the old product at the old
price.").
256 The evaluation of these tests is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Gilbert,
supra note 246, at 77 (concluding that the "no economic sense" test best provides "a wide
berth for innovation"); Jacobson et al., supra note 240, at 33 (advocating use of the
"consumer welfare" test); Salop, supra note 242, at 313-14 (discussing the same).
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assessments can guide the court in making these distinctions. Furthermore, the
difficulties in making such assessments may be overstated: administrative
agencies, for example, have been making many such judgments in this and
related contexts. 257
The second premise raises questions regarding the full range of long-term
effects, including chilling effects on future innovation. One concern is that
antitrust interventions in these settings are counterproductive, because they
reduce the global ex ante incentives for innovation. 258 While antitrust
interventions reduce a potential monopolist's incentive to innovate in theory,
questions remain regarding the size and overall impact of the interventions in
practice. Many observers, for example, believe that the effect of small antitrust
policy changes has no appreciable effect on innovation incentives and, in any
event, has not been empirically established. 259 Furthermore, anticompetitive
effects also affect the innovation by their rivals, either by suppressing rivals'
actual innovation or by reducing rivals' incentives to innovate.260 The
innovation embodied in the product redesign, therefore, is not the only
innovation effect at issue. Thus the link between anticompetitive conduct and
257 Within the Google context, for example, an assessment of the relevant innovation
effects would seem implicit in the various remedies explored by the European Commission
regarding alleged anticompetitive manipulation of search engine results. Presumably, these
remedies attempt to address the underlying harm without unduly interfering with Google's
freedom to innovate. Joaqiun Alumina, Statement on Google Investigation, Press
Conference, Feb. 5, 2014, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseSPEECH-14-
93_en.htm. Within the context of merger reviews, for example, comparisons of the
prospective effects of innovation versus price are frequently made. Gilbert, supra note 246,
at 75 ("In merger analysis, competition authorities engage in a rule of reason balancing of
likely pro-competitive effects of a merger against any likely competitive harm, and take into
account both potential benefits for innovation and possible harm from a reduction of
innovation.").
258 See, e.g., id. at 76 ("Rule of reason analysis, whether based on consumer or total
economic welfare, generally fails to measure the spillover effects from innovation ... and,
perhaps most importantly, does not account for the chilling effect of antitrust scrutiny on
incentives to innovate.").
259 Tracy R. Lewis & Dennis A. Yao, Some Reflections on the Antitrust Treatment of
Intellectual Property, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 609 (1995) ("In summary, there is
disagreement over whether minor changes in antitrust policy matter for inducing innovation.
If they do, there still remains the question of whether the joint effect of current patent and
antitrust policies results in too little or too much innovation.").
260 Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis,
Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 617, 664 (1999) ("However, this
recommendation loses force because of the likely adverse impact of exclusionary conduct
on innovation competition by actual and potential rivals in those markets. If a market is
driven more by innovation than price competition, then entrants also must have an open
environment in order to challenge the monopolist. An overly permissive antitrust regime
may reduce aggregate innovation, as innovation by entrants and small competitors is
reduced by more than innovation by the monopolist increases.").
[Vol. 95:35
]MUZZLING ANTITRUST
rival innovation suggests that assessments regarding innovation effects that
focus solely upon the defendant's innovations may be incomplete. 26'
While the unworkability and chilling innovation arguments against a
balancing approach may be overstated, there is clearly some merit to these
criticisms. The recommendations mitigate these concerns by adopting a
presumption favoring innovation over anticompetitive effects. Balancing only
occurs when innovation magnitude assessments can be made confidently and,
there, balancing would seem to offer a clear improvement over the status quo.
A period of transition will be necessary to migrate from a relatively simple
to a more complex decision rule. Success requires both immediate adaptation
and ongoing leaming. As the courts gain experience identifying and balancing
innovation effects and anticompetitive effects, overcoming the presumption
may become easier, or the presumption could be modified. It is crucial,
however, that the courts do not recreate the unacknowledged balancing
strategy, albeit at a different pivot point, that arguably has been used by some
courts that simultaneously espouse balancing while avoiding it through
aggressively dismissing innovation as pretextual. When transparency is
lacking, it not only undermines the discourse needed to improve legal
outcomes, but it may also prompt other courts and observers to incorrectly
perceive a trend or even a precedent against balancing.
2. Treatment of Speech
Speech is the expression or communication of ideas. 262 This definition
arguably encompasses the sale or use of information products; the information
product itself is content that is then conveyed through its sale or use. While the
foregoing recommendation regarding innovation assumed arguendo the
absence of any speech interest associated with the information product design,
this Section offers recommendations regarding how to identify and, as
warranted, to protect speech-based interests consistent with the First
Amendment. This analysis is particularly important given the increasing
frequency with which antitrust challenges to information products will likely
encounter First Amendment-based defenses. Significantly, this Section
advocates speech-based solicitude that is consistent with First Amendment
protection and does not unnecessarily sacrifice competition policy values.
Even if information products constitute speech, it does not follow that all forms
of allegedly anticompetitive conduct involving such products warrant First
261 But see Gilbert, supra note 246, at 76 (arguing that innovation effects are sometimes
underestimated because they do not account for the impact of innovation on complementary
markets).
262 See generally Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, in THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 155, 153-71 (R.M. Dworkin ed., 1977) (defining "acts of expression"
very broadly to include any speech, publication or other act "linked with proposition or
attitude which it is intended to convey").
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Amendment protection or that, when solicitude is warranted, it applies in a
singular manner regardless of the specific facts.
The challenge attendant to establishing a legal middle ground that
transcends all-or-nothing protection for speech within an antitrust context
reflects, in part, the difficulty with decisions that seek to integrate
noneconomic and economic values. Antitrust law, particularly in recent
decades, has grown increasingly hostile to recognizing any noneconomic
values. Noneconomic values whose antitrust significance has been debated
within this context historically, include the role of small businesses and
business influence on political power. While the specifics vary considerably,
the terms of the debate do not. To what extent, if at all, is a given noneconomic
value reflected in the antitrust regime's laws, their legislative history, and their
common law development?
The speech within this context can be broadly understood as a
"noneconomic value" that poses challenges to the economic thinking that
largely undergirds antitrust law today. Significantly, the speech values at issue
in this Article are derived from and protected by the First Amendment. The
antitrust laws cannot be applied in a manner that violates the First Amendment.
But, that does not mean that the antitrust laws cannot be applied to speech in a
manner consistent with the First Amendment. The recommendations focus
upon legal middle grounds in which the First Amendment modifies a law's
application without conferring immunity from the law or declaring the law
unconstitutional.
a. Definition
The information products at issue herein constitute "speech" as colloquially
defined.263 Whether such expression warrants any First Amendment solicitude
and if so, how much, requires more refined consideration than whether or not
something is political speech and, therefore, receives immunization or no
solicitude accordingly. Towards that end, this Article proposes two additional
categories: cognizable speech and nominal speech. The antitrust actions at
issue allege anticompetitive changes to information products. Rather than
attempting to classify the speech solely with reference to the information
product itself, this recommendation examines whether the basis for the cause
of action implicates the substantive content of the speech as opposed to non-
substantive matters (e.g., purely logistical aspects). When the cause of action
rests on changes to the information product's content, the speech at issue is
classified as cognizable speech and receives solicitude in the antitrust analysis.
When the cause of action concerns changes that do not implicate content,
nominal speech is present and it receives no solicitude in the antitrust
analysis.264
263 See id. at 155 (offering a more formal definition).
24 Obviously, when speech is solely the instrument for illegal activity, e.g., price fixing,
no First Amendment solicitude exists. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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Consider a matter wherein the plaintiff alleges that the defendant increased
the plaintiffs relative cost of attracting business by altering the ranking of the
plaintiff's product. That legal action targets a change in content and, therefore,
implicates cognizable speech. Other changes to an information product's
content that would also implicate cognizable speech include measurement
metrics that make it difficult to compare products.
An allegedly anticompetitive modification to an information product
interface with which complementary products connect illustrates a possible
antitrust challenge that would not implicate cognizable speech. Such a change
involves how the content is conveyed and, therefore, implicates only nominal
speech. Purely functional changes to information products would not receive
speech-based solicitude within the context of an antitrust action. As such, a
potentially anticompetitive redesign that merely entails a different mechanism
by which to convey the same content would constitute conventional, non-
speech-related, innovation. Examples of ostensibly functional modifications
include changes in processing speed, support, reliability, and user interfaces.
The determination of whether speech is cognizable or nominal depends on
whether or not the cause of action implicates questions regarding content.
Hence, the same information product may receive different treatment
depending on the causes of action stated in the complaint. In a manner
somewhat similar to the distinction made in Lorain Journal, which
distinguished actions by a newspaper regarding content and business activities
that were ancillary to the content, 265 this proposal does not extend speech
solicitude to all aspects of an information-provider's conduct merely because
some of its unchallenged conduct merits some speech solicitude.
Nominal speech receives no First Amendment solicitude and, as such,
constitutes an "outcome category" because the same legal outcome results for
all speech falling within the category. Antitrust law would receive its
traditional application notwithstanding the presence of nominal speech, an
outcome that is fully consistent with the First Amendment. The second
category, cognizable speech, includes a broad range of speech interests. To
ensure that the First Amendment protection conferred corresponds sufficiently
to the interest present, this Article proposes two dimensions along which to
distinguish the nature and strength of such speech interests. As such,
cognizable speech constitutes a "treatment category" because even though all
such speech is analyzed similarly, the legal outcomes may vary. The challenge
is to identify dimensions along which cognizable speech, as embodied in
information products, can be distinguished.
Sliding Scale. Distinguishing between nominal and cognizable speech
constitutes a necessary first step to creating a middle ground category for
speech protection. All cognizable speech receives a base level of solicitude in
the antitrust analysis. The next step is to develop treatment criteria that would
265 United States v. Lorain Journal Co., 92 F. Supp. 794, 799 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
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facilitate distinctions within that category. Such distinctions, in turn, support
increases to the base level of solicitude.
Given the general dearth of fully litigated cases within this context, legal
precedent offers few insights regarding the dimensions along which to draw
distinctions among cognizable speech. Nonetheless, two dimensions are
recommended as the starting points for the sliding scale: transparency and
independence. 266 The protection accorded the speech at issue increases as
content of the speech is (1) more transparent regarding speaker biases or
motivations that are relevant to the content of the speech at issue, and (2) more
independent of financial or nonfinancial interests. Speech content is more
transparent if the speaker, for example, discloses its biases, or if the receivers
of the speech generally know that information. Speech content is independent
if no direct link exists between the content of the speech and the revenues of
the speaker firm. The transparency and independence dimensions attempt to
capture the value of the speech to listeners and, therefore, its contribution to
the marketplace of ideas or, in this case, the actual marketplace.2 67 While
speech is generally understood to constitute a non-economic value, the
solicitude it receives is adjusted with reference to antitrust law's consumer
welfare goal. The speech is commerce-based and is valued in terms of the
context of the primary cause of action, antitrust.
Consumer Reports exemplifies the traits of transparency and independence.
Its content is transparent as the magazine makes clear its objectives and the
absence of advertising influences, and it is also independent because its
266 An alternative approach, rejected herein, is a pure sliding scale based on transparency
and independence as dimensions. This Article's recommendation relies primarily on the
cognizable speech category and then employs those two dimensions as a secondary
adjustment. However, transparency and independence, while very important, may not
exhaust the set of potentially relevant dimensions along which commerce-related speech can
be usefully distinguished. Reliance on the general category is a cautious first step that
recognizes the possibility of other important, but as yet unidentified, dimensions relevant to
valuing this speech in the antitrust context.
267 The proposed transparency and independence criteria are similar to requirements used
in consumer protection settings to reduce consumer deception. See, e.g., FED. TRADE
COMM'N, .COM DISCLOSURES: HOW TO MAKE EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES IN DIGITAL
ADVERTISING 6 (2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/press-
releases/ftc-staff-revises-online-advertising-disclosure-
guidelines/130312dotcomdisclosures.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/V5NP-W2ME
(requiring online advertising disclosures to be "clear and conspicuous"); see also Press
Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Consumer Protection Staff Updates Agency's Guidance
to Search Engine Industry on the Need to Distinguish Between Advertisements and Search
Results (June 25, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2013/06/ftc-consumer-protection-staff-updates-agencys-guidance-search, archived
at http://perma.cc/HE4Y-S4BK ("[F]ailing to clearly and prominently distinguish
advertising from natural search results could be a deceptive practice."). The possible value
of such criteria has been widely discussed in the academic literature as well. See, e.g.,
Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 175, at 1183.
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revenues come from reader subscriptions as opposed to advertising by the
firms whose products are evaluated. 268 In contrast, a rating of a financial
instrument that is paid for by the subject of the rating is clearly not
independent speech, nor, if the source of revenues is not disclosed, is it
transparent.
One virtue of transparency as a dimension of analysis is its value neutrality
regarding the substantive content. If the listener is aware of relevant interests
that might motivate particular speech, then the listener can calibrate her or his
reliance on its message accordingly. 269 Transparency is typically achieved
through disclosures, though such disclosures are necessarily imperfect and
frequently depend on the listeners' characteristics. Further solicitude is
appropriate for "independent" speech, which in this context indicates the
absence of any relevant interests to disclose. Independence can be thought of
as a characteristic of the speaker, whereas transparency concerns how listeners
receive disclosures. This is the rationale for treating independence of the
relevant content from strong financial or nonfinancial interests as a separate
dimension. 270
The recommended treatment of speech content in terms of these
characteristics contrasts with the traditional role of speech in First Amendment
cases that disfavor content-based restrictions as a matter of law.271 In the
antitrust setting, speech-based questions do not challenge the antitrust laws
themselves as per se violating the First Amendment, but rather question their
application in a specific case. The focus thus shifts to whether a speech interest
is invoked and to what extent the speech can be reasonably evaluated by the
listeners. 272
268 See Randall Stross, A Shopper's Companion, Still Going Strong, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 11,
2011, at BU3 ("[The fact that subscribers pay for a] consistent policy of not allowing
advertisements has helped Consumer Reports protect a reputation for clearsighted
recommendations, untainted by commercial considerations.").
269 In practice, transparency matters only in the presence of underlying bias. In theory, if
there is no bias, then transparency and independence are not relevant. If there is bias, the
biased speech is arguably better understood by listeners if the bias is disclosed.
270 Another thorny problem involves changes to product "content" associated with
repositioning information products in the marketplace (e.g., to serve a somewhat different
consumer segment). Such content changes may also have anticompetitive effects. The
recommendation does not accord still greater speech-based solicitude to such content
changes largely because such motivations seem to provide easy sanctuaries for intended
anticompetitive conduct. Repositioning, as a legitimate business justification, would be
recognized within a standard antitrust analysis.
271 See, e.g., John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (2005)
("Under current law, content-based speech regulations are highly disfavored and are
presumptively unconstitutional." (citing Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S.
656, 660 (2004)).
272 Arguably, speaker-based discrimination characterizes application of the antitrust laws
as firms with market power are treated differently than those without market power. The
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This Article's examination of First Amendment interests has focused upon
the speech of firms with information products. Ironically, to the extent such
speech interests exist, it is likely that additional and potentially competing
speech interests also warrant consideration. In the information products sector,
if the defendant's information products embody cognizable speech, then so too
would the information products of the defendant's competitors. This Article
designates speech interests other than the defendant's as "secondary speech
interests," that is, speech interests of those other than the defendant that are
oftentimes held by the defendant's competitors. Deterrence of entry, for
example, may involve some suppression of secondary speech. Where there are
very few or no effective competitors (no effective "speakers"), this suppression
has potentially profound implications for speech in the relevant market. The
First Amendment does not directly protect these secondary speech interests,
because no government restriction of that speech would be involved with the
application of the antitrust laws. Within the context of this recommendation,
however, consideration of secondary speech interests is not only legitimate, but
also required. However, under this proposal, secondary speech interests are
recognized only as potential offsets to the defendant's primary speech interest.
b. Protection
Given the foregoing mechanisms to distinguish between cognizable and
nominal speech and to calibrate the strength of the former along at least two
dimensions, the recommended speech-based protection can be addressed. This
Article recommends treating cognizable speech, invoked as a defense to an
antitrust action, as an offset to anticompetitive effects proven in the relevant
antitrust analysis, one that includes the innovation analysis discussed
previously. In effect, cognizable speech constitutes a "minus factor" that
"reduces" the level of anticompetitive harm. Such an offset is analogous to the
role of "plus factors" in a price-fixing analysis. 273
Cognizable speech is a treatment category that contains a sliding scale. All
speech in the category receives a base level of solicitude sufficient only to
reverse close calls that would otherwise result in antitrust liability. This base
level of solicitude can be increased when strong evidence exists that the speech
is independent, or when the speech is not independent but is quite transparent.
In contrast, secondary speech interests reduce the level of solicitude. The
solicitude conferred is capped at a level below that necessary to offset a
moderate anticompetitive effect. Hence, a given cognizable speech interest can
never rise to the level sufficient to effectively confer immunization from
latter are less restricted in their information product-based speech. Of course, this
differential treatment ultimately reflects whether a party can violate the antitrust law or not.
273 See William E. Kovacic, The Identification and Proof of Horizontal Agreements
Under the Antitrust Laws, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 5, 31-55 (1993), for a discussion of the role
of plus factors in establishing horizontal agreements.
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antitrust action as advocated by Volokh and Falk and others. 274 The level of net
solicitude also has a floor at zero, so the maximum effect allowed the
secondary speech interest is to fully offset the primary speech interest.
Secondary Speecl
Tlranspar-en
Independence t
Immunization Base Solicitude No Solicitude
The criteria proposed for assessing the speech interest strength and the
concept of a secondary speech interest offset constitute analytical starting
points. It is expected that additional criteria to gauge the strength of both
primary and secondary speech interests will be identified as experience,
particularly on the part of the judiciary, increases. More generally, the
balancing and middle ground approaches for both innovation and speech are
274 See generally Volokh & Falk, supra note 148. Volokh and Falk advocate for speech
defenses to antitrust actions and appear to desire that courts treat the speech at issue in a
manner akin to that of political speech, which would result in immunization against antitrust
action. See id. at 895-96. But speech in a commercial context is quite different. See, e.g.,
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 380-81 (1977); Linmark Assocs. v. Twp. of
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 98 (1977); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 & n.24 (1976). Its social purpose is typically to provide
information that may shape a future purchase decision. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy,
425 U.S. at 773. Information, in turn, is a critical input to better decision-making and hence
more efficient markets. From this perspective, chilling such speech should be avoided owing
to its impact on efficient decision-making. But rather than suggesting a lexicographic
preference for protecting such speech, as would be consistent with immunization against
antitrust action, this Article argues that speech should be considered along with those factors
that are normally considered in an antitrust analysis.
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expected to evolve as the legal system acquires experience from the use of the
approaches and with the specific application to information product markets.
Such learning is facilitated by open discourse; such discourse is obscured when
courts avoid balancing by finding that it is unnecessary because of
disingenuous or suspect earlier assessments. 275 One implication of such
learning is that, over time, the sliding scale would likely receive increasingly
more weight in determining the size of the minus factor.
More generally, the creation of a cognizable speech category situated
between the polar cases of no solicitude and full solicitude is in keeping with
the First Amendment jurisprudence's demonstrated capacity for greater
nuance, as reflected in its distinctive approaches regarding commercial speech
and defamatory speech.276 One key determination in Central Hudson
concerned whether the public interest promoted by the statute in question
exceeded a threshold sufficient to justify its incursion on commercial speech
interests.277 In the instant recommendation, the question is whether the
competition interest exceeds the threshold to justify overriding the cognizable
speech interest. In both circumstances, a key focus is on the size of the non-
speech interest: the intrinsic speech interest is not distinguished across the
types of speech that fall in the respective categories.
Nonetheless, the legal middle ground this Article advocates is
distinguishable from the intermediate scrutiny standard applied to government
restrictions on commercial advertising. 278 Direct First Amendment challenges
examine whether a given law is constitutional, and the law is upheld or struck
down. Intermediate scrutiny differs from strict scrutiny in the criteria that must
be met for a law to withstand constitutional challenge. 279 When speech
275 Decision-making suffers when a small set of situations dictate preferences and
decision-makers engage in "irrational consistency" by extending these preferences to
decisions involving dissimilar situations. See ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND
MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITCS 138-39 (1976) ("Unless the cost of balancing
values is terribly high.., it will be in the decision-maker's interest to choose explicitly.
Were he aware of the costs and conflicts, he might examine his own values and the evidence
more carefully, extend his search to additional alternatives, and seek creative solutions."
(footnote omitted)).
276 Scanlon has aptly observed that "at least some element of balancing seems to be
involved in almost every landmark First Amendment decision." Scanlon, supra note 262, at
154. He further argues that "[t]he balancing in such decision is not always strictly a matter
of maximizing good consequences, since what is 'balanced' often includes personal rights
as well as individual and social goods." Id. at 154 n.3.
277 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980) ("The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on
commercial speech.").
278 See supra Part II.A.2.a (discussing commercial speech).
279 SMOLLA, supra note 45, § 20:19 ("The test for commercial speech differs from strict
scrutiny in two ways. First, the regulation need not be justified by a 'compelling'
governmental interest; a 'substantial' interest will suffice. Second, . . . the means employed
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considerations arise in the information product redesign contexts at issue, the
constitutional analysis concerns the particular application of the antitrust law
rather than the law itself. It is unnecessary, therefore, for recognition of speech
to confer immunity or no immunity from antitrust law.
The sliding scale proposed herein does allow for some variation in the net
speech interest within the category. What is critical with respect to workability,
however, is that a specific underlying value of speech is not being determined
for the speech embodied in each information product at issue. Rather, each
embodiment of speech receives a category-level value to which adjustments
are made based on factors that affect how easily the listeners can evaluate the
speech. For example, no attempt is made to compare the underlying value of
speech embodied in Nielsen's television ratings and Google's page rankings,
but speech value assigned to the category can be adjusted within a given
context based on its transparency and independence as well as the secondary
speech interests involved.
c. Pretrial Motions and Remedies
The recommendation thus far has focused on a middle ground approach for
addressing cognizable speech interests when assessing antitrust liability. As
related matters, pretrial motions and remedies should also reflect, as necessary,
any speech interests. The frequency with which the antitrust matters at issue
herein have been resolved at the pleading stage underscores the significance of
pretrial motions. Though, as a practical matter, the remedies stage is actually
reached infrequently, the ability to craft antitrust remedies consistent with the
First Amendment is essential to the overall legal process.
Pretrial Motions. Assuming arguendo the presence of a bona fide speech
interest, to what extent-if at all-should such interests force a modification of
not only the actual antitrust analysis (which this Article recommends), but also
the analysis undertaken at either the motion to dismiss or summary judgment
stages of the proceedings? Only one published opinion appears to have directly
addressed this issue.
In the early 1980s, twenty-six independent film producers and directors
alleged that CBS, NBC, and ABC undertook a "concerted policy" to
"freeze... [plaintiffs] out of the documentary film market. 280  The
significance of this case, Levitch v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, lnc.,281
for instant purposes, lies in the limited nature of the broadcasters' First
Amendment defense. They did not claim that the First Amendment immunized
by the government need not be the 'least restrictive' method of achieving its objective.").
280 Levitch v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 649, 655, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
In addition to antitrust claims, the plaintiffs also argued that the defendants had violated
their First Amendment rights. Id. at 654. Such claims against commercial broadcasters,
licensed and regulated by the FCC, had repeatedly failed owing to the absence of
government action. The plaintiffs in Levitch were similarly unsuccessful. Id. at 656.
281 495 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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the challenged conduct from antitrust scrutiny. Instead, the defendants
advocated imposing "a higher standard of pleading upon plaintiffs, to insure
that plaintiffs seek to challenge economic conduct and not protected First
Amendment conduct. '282 Defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to meet
this higher pleading standard. That alleged failure, in turn, provided the basis
for the "defendants' First Amendment defense and their motion to dismiss in
connection therewith. '283 The defendants also argued that the plaintiffs failed
to state an antitrust cause of action even under "normal pleading
requirements." 284
The district court ultimately dismissed the antitrust claims after subjecting
them to traditional pleading requirements. 285 In sharp contrast to most cases
this Article discusses, the Levitch court ruled on the availability of the
proffered First Amendment defense because if found to have merit, the defense
would have affected the standard for assessing the sufficiency of the plaintiffs
claims. 286 Despite its apparent willingness to consider modifying the pleading
standard, albeit in a largely unspecified manner, the court framed its decision
as a choice between polar outcomes. More specifically, it ostensibly held that
only "purely editorial" speech would receive First Amendment solicitude in
the form of antitrust immunity.287 Speech displaying both "editorial" and
"economic" (i.e., anticompetitive) qualities would be subject to traditional
pleading requirements.28 8 The court found that the broadcasters' challenged
conduct was not "easily characterized" because the same decisions regarding
what to air can be viewed as "editorial" discretion and as part of an
anticompetitive boycott. 289 Therefore, it applied the traditional pleading
requirement. 290
The court reached the merits of the broadcasters' First Amendment-based
defense despite the fact that such a determination, as a practical matter, could
282 Id. at 661.
283 Id.
284 Id. at 660.
285 Id. at 662, 679.
286 The claims brought under section 2 of the Sherman Act, which were both
monopolization and attempted monopolization, failed because the court concluded the
plaintiffs could "prove no relevant product market in which any of the network defendants
share exceed[ed] 33 percent." Id. at 668. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs section 1
claims, and section 2 tying claims. Id. at 665, 679.
287 Id. at 661-62.
288 Id. at 661.
289 Id. The conduct at issue clearly implicated fundamental editorial prerogatives
regarding program selection. However, the broadcasters' decisions to air only in-house
productions, the court further concluded, "could arguably be construed as an impermissible
boycott and an attempt to interfere with business relationships in a manner proscribed by the
antitrust laws." Id. at 661.
290 Id. at 662.
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have been avoided. 291 Nonetheless, the court very clearly limited the reach of
its rejection of arguments that the First Amendment required antitrust pleading
requirements. "[A]lthough insufficient to impose a greater procedural burden
upon plaintiffs at the pleading stage," the court held that speech-based
concerns "may very well impose a greater burden upon plaintiffs in the
disposition of this action. 292
Remedies. Once an antitrust violation is found, the court is "empowered to
fashion appropriate restraints" that will deter future violations by the
defendants and will eliminate the unlawful benefits continuing to accrue to
them. 293 The resulting remedial measures "may curtail the exercise of liberties
that the [defendants] might otherwise enjoy;" such restrictions on liberties may
be necessary or even unavoidable given the nature of the violation.294 The First
Amendment has been successfully invoked as a limitation upon the extent to
which a proven antitrust violator's speech may be coerced or restricted as a
remedial measure. As the following cases demonstrate, First Amendment
rights may arise at the remedies phase even when such rights are not
implicated during the liability phase of an antitrust proceeding.
In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,295 the
Supreme Court famously condemned on antitrust grounds the challenged
professional regulations governing engineers that prohibited price advertising
prior to an engineering contract being awarded. 296 The professional society had
argued that such a restriction was necessary because price competition would
undermine safe engineering practices. 297 The majority rejected the professional
society's core position that competition itself constituted the problem.298 While
the determination of the professional society's antitrust liability is well known,
less attention has focused on the debate regarding the constitutionality of the
remedies imposed.
The D.C. District Court imposed three remedial measures, and the Circuit
Court only upheld two of them, namely the prohibition on the professional
society continuing to deter such competition and the requirement that it
affirmatively publicize its new policy consistent with the court's ruling.299 The
Circuit Court found unconstitutional, under the First Amendment, the third
291 Id. at 660 (acknowledging that consideration of defendants' First Amendment defense
was not necessary unless plaintiffs proved successful in antitrust analysis).
292 Id. at 662.
293 Nat'l Soc'y of Prof't Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
294 Id. at 697.
295 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
296 Id. at 679.
297 See id. at 695-96.
298 See id at 696 ("[T]he Rule of Reason does not support a defense based on the
assumption that competition itself is unreasonable.").
299 United States v. Nat'l Soc. of Prof'l Eng'rs, 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff'd, 435
U.S. 679 (1978).
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remedy, which required the defendant to affirmatively endorse the desirability
of price competition. 300 The Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court's
decision regarding remedies. 30 1 Chief Justice Burger dissented from the portion
of the judgment that prohibited the engineering society from stating in its
published ethical standards its viewpoint that "competitive bidding is
unethical. 30 2 Burger argued, "The First Amendment guarantees the right to
express such a position and that right cannot be impaired under the cloak of
remedial judicial action. 30 3
ES Development, Inc. v. R WM Enterprises, Inc.,30 4 also a section 1 case,
illustrates the potential pitfalls associated with broad speech restrictions as
remedial measures in antitrust cases. 30 5 The district court found the defendant
automobile dealers conspired to prevent the entry of a prospective competitor
to the Chesterfield Auto Mall. 30 6 The defendants were enjoined from
"individually communicating with their respective manufacturers concerning
the Mall for the indefinite future. 30 7 While the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision to include relief that hinders the defendant's exercise
of commercial speech, it further noted that such "broad equitable powers are
not without limit. 30 8 In particular, "[a] proper tailoring of relief to the
exigencies of a particular case is especially important in cases such as the
present one, in which the relief granted necessarily carries constitutional
ramifications. 30 9 The circuit court, relying upon Central Hudson, defined
properly tailored remedies as "'narrowly drawn[,]... extend[ing] only as far as
the interest it serves. 310 It then held the district court's restriction to be
"inappropriate" because it constituted an "open-ended restriction upon
[defendants'] individual exercise of their constitutionally protected rights of
commercial speech .... 311 The case was remanded to the district court for
determination of a reasonable time limit for the injunction; the circuit court
suggested a time frame of two to three years. 31
2
300 See id. at 984.
301 Nat'l Soc. of Prof'l Engineers, 435 U.S. at 699.
302 Id. at 701 (Burger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
303 Id.
304 939 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1991).
305 Id. at 548.
306 Id. at 550.
307 Id. at 558 (emphasis added).
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Id. (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 565 (1980)).
311 Id.
312 Id. at 559.
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B. Application and Discussion
This Section fleshes out the foregoing recommendations by applying them
to the Google and Nielsen antitrust cases involving information products. The
speech interests present are not the traditional commerce-related speech
interests embodied in commercial advertising that involve speech about the
products. Rather, the products at issue involve the conveyance of information
and are themselves arguably speech.3t 3 In both settings, the social significance
of this information is self-evidently high. Google's search engine is used to
obtain information that is all-encompassing (e.g., political as well as
commercial), and the Nielsen ratings affect a media outlet's ability to sustain
itself through advertising revenues. While these cases facilitate elaboration of
the recommendations, a comprehensive analysis remains premature.
Google. Competitors of Google's various vertical search engine sites (e.g.,
online shopping sites) have argued that Google's general search engine, which
generates a web page ordering in response to user search queries, has unfairly
disadvantaged competitors' sites by effectively demoting them in its PageRank
system.314 Various bases for causes of action could be alleged regarding such
conduct, including raising rivals' costs and disparagement. 315 Google's speech-
based defense appears to be that its PageRank system is analogous to the
editorial judgment a newspaper exercises when selecting which stories to run
and, therefore, constitutes "opinions" warranting antitrust immunity. 31 6 The
313 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011).
314 See, e.g., The Power of Google: Serving Consumers or Threatening Competition:
Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy & Consumer Rights of the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (testimony of Jeremy Stoppelman,
Cofounder and CEO, Yelp!
Inc.), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ 11-9-
21StoppelmanTestimony.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Z8DM-2NNV; see also Matthew
Ingram, Google's Zagat Buy Could Give Search Critics More Ammo, GIGAOM (Sept. 9,
2011, 10:03 AM), http://gigaom.com/2011/09/09/googles-zagat-buy-could-give-search-
critics-more-ammo/, archived at http://perna.cc/9MES-D37P.
315 For disparagement to provide the basis for an antitrust action it must do more than
hurt a competitor; it must undermine competition in the market. To undermine competition,
the disparagement must deceive parties (e.g., customers) whose support is important to the
viability of competitors. In a handful of reported cases that considered disparagement as
potentially anticompetitive conduct, courts have assessed the impact of the message by
analyzing factors such as the stance with which the message was received and the ability
message's target to respond (e.g., message disseminated to an identifiable audience). Very
infrequently have courts been receptive to disparagement as an antitrust cause of action. See
supra note 50.
316 Volokh & Falk, supra note 148, at 886, 884 ("[E]ach search engine's editorial
judgment is much like many other familiar editorial judgments [including] ... about which
wire service stories ... are to go 'above the fold' . . . . And all these exercises of editorial
judgment are fully protected by the First Amendment."); see also id. at 895 (Part III of their
article is entitled, "The First Amendment Protects Search Engine Results Against Antitrust
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speech analysis, which is an input to the general antitrust analysis under the
recommendation, is examined first.
Under this Article's proposed speech analysis, the first inquiry is whether
Google's page rankings, as generated by its general search engine, constitute
cognizable speech.3 17 The information product is the ranking of web pages in
response to a search query. A systematic and undeservedly low ranking of
competitors' (vertical) web sites can be interpreted as an implicit denigration
of those competitors, which potentially has significant implications for the
amount of traffic those sites receive, especially given Google's market share in
the general search engine market.318 Allegations regarding anticompetitive
(unduly depressed) page rankings concern substantive content and, not, for
example, purely its conveyance or other aspects of nominal speech. Such
allegations, therefore, implicate cognizable speech as defined herein.
Given the presence of cognizable speech, the next step entails examination
of the content's independence and transparency, which further informs the
level of speech-based solicitude warranted. Here, the content at issue is not
revenue independent. If Google's own vertical site search links are ranked
higher and its rivals ranked lower, Google can be expected to increase its
revenue. Furthermore, the content is not transparent. Absent appropriate
disclosures, most users of Google's general search engine cannot be expected
to know which firms Google owns or has a large financial interest in. Thus,
under the proposal, Google's cognizable speech interests, absent secondary
speech interests (which are not analyzed here given lack of public information
about the case), would at the very most confer only the minimum level of
speech solicitude in the antitrust analysis. 319 That is, this speech interest would
influence, in Google's favor, only extremely close antitrust decisions.
The antitrust analysis would balance the pro- and anticompetitive effects of
redesigns to Google's PageRank system while accounting for speech as a
minus factor. Without greater knowledge about the specifics of the case, it is
impossible to predict the ultimate outcome under the recommendations.
However, the case can be used to illustrate inquiries that bear on key
determinations required in the proposal.
Assessment of the procompetitive effect can be divided into two steps: (1)
determining the scope of the relevant innovation at issue, and (2) estimating
the magnitude of the innovation. In cases where multiple "innovations" exist
within a "single" product redesign, an important question will sometimes be
whether parts of the redesign are reasonably integrated or are essentially
Law").
317 For the sake of completeness, it is clear that Google's PageRank would not qualify as
political speech and gain immunization from the antitrust laws.
318 See Lee, supra note 18 (observing Google's ascent to a 67% share of the search
engine market).
"I See generally Pitofsky, supra note 250, at 1067 & n.44 (advocating for a limited role
for political considerations in antitrust).
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separable. 320 For example, if the allegedly anticompetitive aspect of the
redesign consists of fairly contained software code which, if removed, would
not adversely effect the redesigned product, then a court might favorably
respond to a plaintiff's argument that the redesign at issue should be limited to
a subset of the full redesign which would, of course, change the balance of pro-
and anticompetitive effects in favor of the plaintiff.321 Then, given a definition
of the redesign at issue, the procompetitive effect is assessed by estimating the
magnitude of the innovation by, for example, comparing and assessing the
changes of the page rankings relative to other search engines.
One can partially gauge the anticompetitive effects by determining the
relative reliance of the affected market on referral links by Google's general
search engine, comparing the rankings of firms in the affected markets by other
general search engines, and evaluating the change in sales resulting from the
modifications. 322 Because the anticompetitive effect depends on how much
traffic the redesign diverted, the source and quantity of referrals to the
allegedly disadvantaged websites can be analyzed to assess the size of the
effect of the redesign.
Given a section 2 violation, the defendants must not only cease their
misconduct, but also, oftentimes, abide by remedial measures.323 In theory,
remedies involving anticompetitive page rankings would entail algorithm
revisions to eliminate the predatory redesign. Given the dynamic nature of the
marketplace (the natural changing of rankings over time) and the frequency
with which search algorithms are revised, instituting meaningful remedial
measures would be challenging. Designing appropriate antitrust remedies may
require particular attention to ensuring the sufficiency of their scope so as to
320 This is a form of a less restrictive alternatives inquiry, because the question is
essentially whether a different design could have achieved all of the desired consumer
benefits while avoiding the anticompetitive effects. Recognizing the challenges and dangers
of such an approach, the proposal recommends limiting the use of this approach to settings
in which such a subdivision is quite clear.
321 Jacobson et al., supra note 240, at 9.
322 The FTC's public statement announcing the closing of its Google investigation noted
that "other competing general search engines adopted many similar design changes,
suggesting that these changes are a quality improvement with no necessary connection to
the anticompetitive exclusion of rivals." See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 10, at 2.
323 The Department of Justice Antitrust Division's 2008 report on single-firm conduct,
which it has since withdrawn, stated that "[t]he central goals of remedies in government
section 2 cases are to terminate the defendant's unlawful conduct, prevent its recurrence,
and re-establish the opportunity for competition in the affected market. Section 2 remedies
should achieve these goals without unnecessarily chilling legitimate competitive conduct
and incentives." DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE
SHERMAN ACT, ch. 9, at 143 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/2
3668 lchapter9.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/N4TZ-E435.
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avoid easy circumvention. 324 However, emphasis upon ensuring the adequacy
of antitrust remedies may require tempering so as to avoid the potential for
unduly chilling speech. Such chilling would be more likely to occur when the
speech at issue is not indirectly protected through the operation of antitrust law
(e.g., protection of innovation).
Nielsen. Nielsen has dominated the television audience measurement market
for decades and has been the subject of numerous antitrust lawsuits and
investigations. Here, the proposed frameworks are applied to allegations taken
from antitrust cases involving Nielsen's replacement of older meter-diary with
the LPM for measuring television audience shares. The presence or absence of
cognizable speech turns on whether or not the antitrust cause of action
concerns content.
Consider first Sunbeam's allegation that Nielsen engaged in predatory
innovation. Though the product redesign generates content (audience ratings),
the allegation itself does not concern content. Therefore, Nielson's speech
would be classified as nominal speech for the purposes of this antitrust cause
of action. Here, the redesign is treated as a conventional (non-speech) product
redesign-the speech embodied in the Nielsen's product is essentially
collapsed into pure innovation. Also consider the restrictions that limited how
the licensee of Nielsen's ratings could use the data and allegedly increased the
costs of switching to another rating provider.325 Such restrictions operate on
the conveyance of the information; hence, for the purpose of this cause of
action, Nielsen's information product would also be classified as nominal
speech.
Finally, consider the allegation that Nielsen biased its rating system to favor
large cable operators, which, in turn, increased barriers to entry by making it
less attractive for key buyers to switch to competing rating products. As with
predatory innovation, the antitrust issue concerns deterring entry, but unlike
predatory innovation, the means by which entry is deterred is alteration of the
content of a rating product. Hence, under the recommended approach, this
cause of action implicates cognizable speech.
Given that cognizable speech is implicated, the next step is to determine,
using the dimensions of independence and transparency, whether the strength
of the speech interest justifies a relatively larger or smaller minus factor in the
antitrust analysis. The bias in the rating system will not confer direct revenue
324 In its second settlement proposal to the European Commission, Google offered to
give greater prominence to the websites of the firms that were allegedly the targets of
Google's conduct. The European Commission rejected this proposal. See Charles Arthur,
European Commission Rejects Google 's Latest Proposals to Settle Antitrust
Case, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 20, 2013, 10:10
AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/dec/20/european-commission-rejects-
google-proposals-antitrust-case, archived at http://perma.cc/7X8A-CVPP; James Kanter,
Google Makes New Offer to Settle its European Union Antitrust Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10,
2013, at 133.
325 Sunbeam v. Nielsen, 711 F.3d 1264, 1269 n.11 (1 th Cir. 2013).
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benefits to Nielsen if Nielsen does not receive different payments depending
on the ratings. If this is the case, then Nielsen's system is revenue independent.
However, Nielsen presumably presents its ratings as unbiased so that, if a bias
exists, it is not transparent, in part, because a bias is not disclosed and, in part,
because listeners do not have an alternative way of assessing whether a system
is biased. Lack of transparency is a strong argument against increasing the size
of the minus factor beyond the minimum level provided in the cognizable
speech category.
Finally, one can argue that secondary speech interests exist and are
sufficiently strong to offset the primary speech interest. Secondary speech
interests would be interests associated with the deterred entrants who,
presumably, are prevented from introducing their information product to the
market. Given the difficulty of generating speech about household viewing
absent any alternative rater in most markets, finding a secondary speech
interest is plausible. Such a recognition, combined with the weakness of the
(cognizable) primary speech, makes it possible that no net speech interest will
inure to Nielsen in the antitrust analysis.
For those antitrust causes of action implicating only nominal speech, the
antitrust analysis would proceed with no First Amendment solicitude. If an
innovation-based defense is proffered, this Article recommends actually
balancing the design's pro- and anticompetitive effects. Given the likelihood
that Nielsen would eventually have introduced some variant of the LPM
system, a key issue revolves around timing, with the plaintiffs arguing that the
redesign at issue either did not constitute an innovation (given its defects) or
the innovation was small.326 Potential competition is a factor that usually
accelerates the introduction of redesigned products, perhaps, merely reducing
the level of innovation embodied in the redesign.
Under current antitrust law, Nielsen's redesign would not likely be deemed
pretextual. As a switch to a technology similar to that of the potential entrant
and likely to have been adopted in the future, the redesign would probably be
seen as embodying some innovation, which under an all-or-nothing antitrust
analysis would lead to a finding of no antitrust liability.327 Under the
recommendation, a small innovation can be outweighed by a large
anticompetitive effect, making it more likely (all things being equal) that such
a scenario could result in antitrust liability. Evidence of the magnitude of the
innovation would include analyses of the change in data collection costs and
analyses of the improvement in accuracy of the redesigned system's
measurements. Thus, for example, if the redesign resulted in modest cost
326 See Sunbeam Television Corp. v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc. 763 F. Supp. 2d 1341,
1352-53 (S.D. Fla. 2011), aff'd, 711 F.3d 1264 (1lth Cir. 2013).
327 Note that under the current legal treatment, a dominant firm's ability to introduce a
poor implementation of the system that is protected from antitrust liability has the potential
for reducing the incentives of actual and potential competitors from innovating in this
market space.
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reductions but no change in accuracy, because premature deployment led to
many errors, the procompetitive effect would seem to be relatively small.
The primary anticompetitive effect at issue in Nielsen is deterred entry.
Establishing this effect requires both the identification and the assessment of
potential competition pursuant to standard antitrust analysis. Relevant evidence
would include internal planning documents regarding the implementation
schedule and where and how aggressively the new system was rolled out.
Additionally, a plaintiff could argue a monopoly broth theory by establishing
that the product redesign was only one of multiple allegedly anticompetitive
actions taken to suppress competition and the actions together showed both an
intent to suppress competition as well as a more effective means by which this
goal could be accomplished. A strong monopoly broth argument provides one
mechanism by which an anticompetitive effect can be strengthened enough to
overcome a small, procompetitive innovation effect.
Part III revisited the Google and Nielsen examples identified at this Article's
outset to illustrate how the recommended framework could be applied to
speech and innovation-based defenses made in antitrust actions involving
information products. Adoption of the recommended middle ground has the
advantage of more realistically handling the speech and innovation issues that
will emerge increasingly in the future, and the disadvantage of increased
complexity. Arguably, the latter difficulties have been exaggerated by those
favoring simpler determinations, but, in any event, one should expect those
difficulties to decline as courts gain experience with balancing and as the
principles that guide the determinations are further developed and refined.
Thus, the proposal offers both an immediate improvement over the existing
system and a promise for further progress.
CONCLUSION
The information economy has given rise to the emergence of powerful firms
in the business of information products. Some of these firms, such as Google
and Nielsen, dominate their respective markets and have had product redesigns
questioned and, at times, challenged as anticompetitive by private parties and
govemments alike. These firms have typically responded to these allegations
by arguing that the product changes at issue embody procompetitive
innovations and, therefore, are not anticompetitive. An additional defense
argued with increasing frequency is that their products constitute protected
speech and should be immunized entirely from antitrust scrutiny.
When those product redesigns are decidedly incremental and arguably
anticompetitive, the application of all-or-nothing legal standards provides
inadequate protections for the underlying First Amendment rights and
competition policy values at stake. Towards that end, this Article advocates
more nuanced mechanisms that offer legal middle grounds as alternatives to
the polar outcomes resulting from the application of current law. The analytical
frameworks recommended are admittedly and, indeed, intentionally more
complex than currently exist. But, that complexity derives from converting de
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facto rules and implicit assumptions into express determinations, as well as
from engaging the challenge of trade-offs between incommensurate values
posed by potentially anticompetitive conduct in the form of redesigns to
information products.
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